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procedure cal 1)及分散物件(di s t ributed obj ects)是不同的。它與別不同的 
特 點 在 於 用 戶 端 軟 件 設 定 （ c l i e n t c u s t o m i z a t i o n )及自我包有 
(self-contained-ness)。當用戶送出一位流動代理之後，用戶就如在流動代理 




















Mobile agent paradigm evolves as a promising distributed computing paradigm. 
Different from the existing paradigms like message passing, remote procedure 
calls, and distributed objects, mobile agent paradigm offers two properties: client 
customization, and self-contained-ness. End users virtually install new software 
on the agent platform by dispatching personalized agents, and the agents are 
self-contained programs that encompass the whole decision logic delegated by 
the end users. 
Mobile agents moving around the network are not safe. The remote hosts 
that accommodate the agents can initiate all kinds of attacks and attempt to 
analyze the agents' decision logic, and agents' accumulated data. A m o n g the 
many security requirements, confidentiality and anonymity are two of the most 
important issues that have not been solved satisfactorily. This thesis examines 
these two security requirements. First, we introduce the notion of entropy to 
measure the intention brought by each agent. By perturbing the associated in-
tention spectrum by either adding noisy codes or splitting the agent, we can 
achieve confidentiality. Second, by modifying the existing approaches in hid-
ing the identities and adopting them in mobile agent systems, we can achieve 
anonymity. 
iii 
For the sake of completeness, open issues related to the protection of mo-
bile agents are presented. This gives an account on the challenging problems 
in security, performance and the side effects to hold secure agent systems. A n 
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^ optimizing protocol to trade off the two contrasting factors - security and per-
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1.1 Evolution of the mobile agent paradigm 
In the course of Internet proliferation, many network-related technologies are 
examined for possible growth and evolution. In the old days, computation re-
lies solely on some large sophisticated devices. Those devices are sophisticated 
enough that all processing are done on them, and the far-end users are fed up 
with the processed data behind the dumb terminals. As computing devices and 
the underlying network keep on improving, computation no longer stays dedicat-
edly on those several devices. Instead, computation is distributed. The changes 
from the original centralized approach to the latter distributed approach pave a 
solid ground for many breakthrough applications to happen. 
Proceed along the line of distributed computing, three major enabling tech-
nologies are in place. In historical order, they are the message passing systems, 
remote procedure call, and distributed object systems [1]. The latter one builds 
on top of the previous one. Message passing systems are the core of all networked 
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systems. Software resides on two ends, and they communicate with each other 
by sending simple passive messages over the network. Applications like FTP, 
the Web, or email are examples based on simple message passing. As obvious as 
we can observe, the communication protocol in message passing system restricts 
the services that are available to the clients. O n the client side, we have little 
flexibility to extend the capabilities of the server. To make the services used 
by the clients more generic, we are looking for alternatives to build up servers 
that provide bundles of software modules. Clients access those software modules 
through some well-defined programming interfaces. 
Remote procedure call and distributed objects are approaches that make the 
programming interfaces visible for remote parties to tap into. In remote pro-
cedure call (RPC), a program communicates with another program on another 
computer by calling the functions provided by that computer [2]. This is much 
like the program is calling a local function. The server exposes the functions for 
many far end clients. Distributed objects work similarly to RPC, only with an 
object-oriented abstraction on top of procedure calls. Instead of calling a pre-
defined function, the remote party invokes the objects resided on the server. By 
invoking the distributed objects, the remote party can access the properties and 
methods of the objects. The major standard is O M G CORBA，a language neu-
tral specification for communicating object systems [3]. Competitors to C O R B A 
include Microsoft's D C O M architecture [4] and the various distributed object 
systems [5] [6]. With reference to the above computing paradigms, the client 
can access remote functions or remote objects. However, those functions and 
objects are pre-defined on the server and we have no rooms to customize our 
functions and objects. How can the above approaches be derived to make client 
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customization possible? The answer key is on the idea of mobile agent. 
Mobile agents further evolve by introducing two more elements: one is client 
customization; the other is further assembling of the software modules into a 
self-contained entity, or say, a program. This is different from the approaches 
mentioned, where the software modules are maintained on the server side, and 
are kept as functions or objects in a loosely coupled setting. Mobile agents are 
programs, typically written in script languages, enabled with certain properties 
to work on behalf of human users in a distributed heterogeneous environment. 
The mobile agent is firstly resided on a home machine, and it is dispatched to 
a remote host for execution. The accommodating host would provide suitable 
runtime environment for the piece of software, the mobile agent, to execute. 
The mobile agent would execute, collect host-specific information, and generate 
runtime states and variables ready to migrate to the second host in the itinerary. 
This process continues until the mobile agent returns home with useful informa-
tion from the last host in the itinerary. The working mechanism of the mobile 
agent could be readily observed in the following figure (Figure 1.1). 
What makes the mobile agent a different name from ordinary software? To 
differentiate mobile agents from other pieces of ordinary software, we could 
specifically investigate the properties associated with mobile agents [7]. Al-
though researchers do not come to a definitive characterization of mobile agents, 
their ideas converge to a certain extent. Mobile agents should be, at least, au-
tonomous, adaptive and learning, and mobile to worth their name [8] [9]. By 
autonomous, mobile agents can carry out some set of operations on behalf of 
the users independently. It is meant that the operations done by mobile agents 
should best be transparent to the users, and the operations should be done on 
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Figure 1.1: The working mechanism of a mobile agent. 
the interests of the users too. By adaptive and learning, mobile agents can learn 
and adapt to their environment, both in terms of users' objectives, and in terms 
of the external environment. It is meant that the mobile agents should be "wise" 
enough to learn from the past experience, and the present situation, and are not 
necessarily bounded by a set of pre-defined decision logic. By mobile, mobile 
agents can move around a number of hosts that accommodate them and pro-
vide execution environment for them. Apart from these three properties, other 
properties are still in the debate in the formal theory of agents. Properties like 
persistency, goal-oriented capability, communicative and collaborative power are 
cases in point. 
With this evolution, mobile agents come out as one of the possible paradigms 
in distributed computing. What blessings and curses do mobile agents bring? Is 
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1.2 Terminology 
To facilitate our discussion in this thesis, we have identified some common ter-
minology used in various publications. Firstly, we have the mobile agents. W e 
mean mobile agents, same as the introduction in section 1.1，software entities 
that are roaming in the network. Other equivalent names are itinerant agents, 
distributed agents and so on. For the machines that provide accommodation, 
we usually use the term mobile agent platform. Besides, mobile agent hosts, 
mobile agent platforms, mobile agent servers, accommodating hosts can also 
be used interchangeably. To carry out specific applications, we require mobile 
agents and mobile agent platforms to work together. The group that relates mo-
bile agents and mobile agent platforms is called the mobile agent system. The 
mobile agent system mentions the necessary hardware and software to group 
together the agents and platforms for meaningful real life applications. Lastly, 
we have the mobile agent paradigm, which we refer to an approach to offer 
distributed computing solutions using mobile agents. 
Several mobile agent systems are developed, and hence the corresponding 
mobile agents and mobile agent platforms [51] - [55]. Agent systems in [51 -
53] are university projects while systems in [54] - [55] are commercial products. 
Agent Tel [51] is developed at the University of Dartmouth. It supports strong 
mobility by providing an extended Tel interpreter. Strong mobility means the 
transfer of both code and execution state while weak mobility means the transfer 
of code and initialization data only. In Agent Tel, the mobile agent is imple-
mented as a Unix process running the language interpreter. Agents can only 
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share resources provided by the operating system since they execute in differ-
ent address spaces. A n agent server is also implemented to allow inbound and 
outbound operations of the agents. Ara [52] is developed at the University of 
Kaiserslautern and it supports strong mobility. Mobile agents in Ara can be 
written in C, C + + or Tel languages. The core system in Ara spans an array of 
interpreters to support agents written in different languages. The core system 
also provides services for the activated agents on the interpreters. Mole [53] is 
developed at the University of Stuttgart and it supports weak mobility. Mobile 
agents in Mole are Java objects that run as threads of the Java Virtual Machine 
(JVM), which is abstracted as a place in the system. A place provides access to 
the underlying operating system through service agents. 
Java Aglets [54] is developed at I B M Tokyo Research Laboratory in Japan 
and it extends Java with support for weak mobility. Similar to Mole [53]，each 
mobile agent is a thread in a Java interpreter, which is the core component on 
the agent server. The Java Aglets API provides a set of basic services to the 
mobile agent threads on the interpreter. For example, agents can retrieve the 
list of agents currently contained in the interpreter. Telescript [55] is developed 
at General Magic, Inc. and it is an object-oriented language suitable for the 
development of large distributed applications. Telescript was the first system to 
bring mobile agents into the public conscience. 
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1.3 Beneficial aspects 
Mobile agents evolve from the existing distributed computing paradigms with 
several novelties. The novelties have been discussed extensively in many lit-
eratures [10] [11]. In particular, the worthwhile points are autonomy, client 
customization and real-time interaction capability offered by the mobile agent 
paradigm. These points are explained qualitatively below. 
1.3.1 Autonomy 
One special feature of mobile agents is their ability to work independently and 
non-interactively. In the existing distributed computing models, computations 
are done with the interactions between parties on two ends. Either messages or 
function calls with parameters are flowing back and forth between the parties. 
The network traffic caused by these models is ongoing and intermittent during 
the program executions on both ends. Unlike the existing models, mobile agents 
reduce the number of network interactions to the single dispatch and the sin-
gle return action. Although the overall traffic caused by the mobile agents is 
not in all cases less than the traffic caused by the existing paradigms [12]，the 
only transmission of mobile agent makes the transmission type asynchronous, 
and reduces the number of interactions. This is especially useful for low band-
width, high-latency and high-cost access network. Being bottlenecked by the 
bandwidth, the mobile devices could still achieve the information located in the 
remote hosts, without continuously communicating with the server to filter for 
useful information. Besides, the asynchronous type of connection requires the 
mobile devices to go online only when the mobile agent is to dispatch, and when 
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the mobile agent is to return. 
1.3.2 Client customization 
The mobile agent paradigm encourages the clients to extend the functionality of-
fered by the server software; mobile agents are customized for end users to carry 
out specific operations. In our existing distributed computing models like R P C 
and distributed objects, exposed functions are defined and established on the 
server, and no rooms are left for client customization. Clients are confined to the 
services provided by the service: in case the clients want to have a new service, 
the service must be installed on the server. With the idea of mobile agent, the 
clients are virtually installing programs onto the server when the mobile agent 
migrates from one host to the other. Mobile agent is in the form that carries 
program's code and data, and the agent could be executed with its own logic 
and its accumulated data when an accommodating platform is provided. For 
instance, the mobile agent could be programmed to make host-specific database 
queries, to interact with other mobile agents for business transactions. The mo-
bile agent could be further programmed to satisfy specific client's requirement. 
This widens the scale of server software simply by allowing clients to implant 
new software on the server. 
1.3.3 Attendant and real time interactions 
The mobile agent paradigm is especially suitable for time critical applications as 
mobile agents are moved close to the information source. By using the existing 
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over the network if he wants to access server's resources. By employing mobile 
agents to work on behalf of the users, the end users simply dispatch a mobile 
agent and allow the mobile agent to interact with the server's resources locally 
on the server's machine. A n ongoing interaction does not require a series of 
ongoing communications. The mobile agent can make decisions according to 
the programmed logic without interactively asking for user's confirmation. This 
is especially important to applications that require frequent and repetitive hu-
man interventions, and that require very real time responses. Applications like 
auctions and stock market are examples that require large amount of human 
participation. For instance, we program the mobile agent to follow our bidding 
strategy and delegate the work to the mobile agent. Mobile agent works on our 
behalf to stay alert on the remote hosts. 
The above benefits are generally accepted as the promises the mobile agent 
would guarantee in distributed computing. However, flipping the coin to the 
other side, mobile agents do raise a number of concerns. Those concerns hinder 
the wide scale deployment of mobile agents in the Internet scale. 
1.4 Fundamental deployment bottleneck: secu-
rity concern 
The mobile agent paradigm is considered to be novel, but undoubtedly this 
paradigm is not in its perfection and there are several deployment concerns. For 
example, we have the reliability concerns and security concerns on the mobile 
agents that are circulating on the network. What can we assure once the mobile 
agent is dispatched from the home machine? Can we assure that the mobile 
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agent is executed without any software conflicts or hardware conflicts? Can we 
assure that the mobile agent is executed without any malicious interruptions or 
attacks? The first question brings in our reliability concerns, while the latter 
question expresses our security concerns. There is a considerable body of work 
devoted to the first question, attempting to make the state of the mobile agent 
persistent when software or hardware conflicts happen, or when the network is 
out of service temporary. The work on reliability could be found on [20] [21] [22 . 
The second question, which relates to the security problems of the mobile agent 
systems, worth much more effort because there are still many unsolved issues. 
To better discuss this fundamental deployment bottleneck, we have the following 
main kinds of security concerns if mobile agent systems are to be deployed in 
the Internet environment. 
1.4.1 Risking the mobile agent hosts 
W e are aware that it is not necessarily safe to execute a piece of software from un-
known origins; this situation applies equally well to mobile agents coining from 
unknown source. W e have reports of malicious computer program almost every-
day [13]. The computer programs try to intrude other people's computers and 
corrupt the data. Terms like Trojan horses, viruses, worms are different classes 
of malicious programs that are posing threats to the executing computers [14 . 
In mobile agent systems, mobile agents are the moving entities that iterate on 
the network and carry out computations on behalf of the human users [15] [16'. 
Since they are supposed to lessen the repetitive work previously done by the hu-
man users, they are supposed to have a wide range of capabilities. For instance, 
the mobile agents help make decisions, initiate network communications with 
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other agents and platforms, access the file system of the remote hosts. Those 
actions would give no harms if they are used properly, but it is not generally 
the real case. Hackers can make use of the mobile agents to tap into the mobile 
agent hosts. They exploit security holes of the hosts, and initiate attacks on 
them. For example, they use the mobile agents to modify the software settings 
of the computer and make the software behave abnormally, to access the critical 
information on the database, to send huge amount of data over the network for 
flooding purpose. Without a safe mechanism to verify, authenticate, authorize 
and execute the mobile agent, the host is very probably at stake. This security 
problem has been identified in the early times when the mobile agent paradigm 
is proposed; therefore, there are many studies working on this security problem. 
References could be found in [17] [18] [19 . 
1.4.2 Risking the mobile agents 
The vulnerability of mobile agent hosts under the visit of mobile agents has 
drawn much more attention than the vulnerability of mobile agents executing in 
the hosts; in fact, mobile agents are also at stake. As mentioned, mobile agents 
hop from one host to another host with the static code, the accumulated states 
and data. The mobile agent host provides necessary execution environment when 
the mobile agents are requested to move in. Since the execution environment 
is provided by the host, the host has complete control on it, and can use it to 
analyze or modify the static code and dynamic state of the mobile agent. For 
instance, the host can delay the execution of the mobile agents, can execute the 
mobile agents with modified semantics, can modify the data it carries, and many 
others. The mobile agent, both its static code and dynamic state not protected 
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in any context, is exposed entirely to the host. In the worst case, the host can 
directly kidnap the mobile agents and make it never return to the home machine. 
In this case, the mobile agent cannot carry out the tasks assigned by the human 
users. This violates the original delegation purpose in deploying mobile agents. 
Besides, mobile agent is also under the security attacks of peer mobile agents. 
According to the studies done by NIST [23], attacks like masquerading, denial 
of service, repudiation, and unauthorized access are possible. For instance, an 
agent might attempt to disguise its identity in an effort to deceive the agent 
with which it is communicating. Besides, an agent can launch a denial-of-service 
attack by repeatedly sending messages to another agent so as to deprive of its 
available resources. This is called live-locked when the critical stage of the mobile 
agent's task is unable to finish because more work is continuously generated for 
it to do. Repudiation occurs when an agent, participating in a transaction or 
communication, later claims that the transaction or communication never took 
place. If there are loopholes in the mobile agent host, an agent can directly 
interfere with another agent by invoking its public methods, or by accessing 
and modifying the agent's code and data. This forms the unauthorized access 
attacks. W e can observe that agents are not only under the risk from hosts, but 
also under the risk from peer agents. 
1.4.3 The difficult problem 
Generally speaking, we have just come across two security concerns if mobile 
agent is to be deployed: one is for the mobile agent host, one is for the mobile 
agent. Many studies have discussed the ways to protect the hosts against mali-
cious mobile agents. However, the research on protecting mobile agents against 
12 
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malicious hosts is still in its infancy. Some researchers believe that it is not pos-
sible to protect mobile agents completely because the mobile agent is beyond 
the control of the home machine, but we have no consensus at this moment. 
W e are sure it takes much more research work to derive theories or schemes in 
protecting mobile agents in order to make the idea of mobile agents realistic in 
large-scale deployment. In this way, this thesis will specifically shed light on 
various aspects in protecting mobile agents against malicious hosts. 
1.5 Contribution of this thesis 
This thesis addresses various aspects in protecting mobile agents against mali-
cious hosts. In particular, this thesis provides a framework to discuss: 
• The basis of attacks initiated by the malicious hosts. This fundamentally 
explains what causing various attacks. 
• The basis of defense to be achieved by the mobile agents. This generalizes 
the security requirements we are looking for. 
• Confidentiality in mobile agent systems. This develops theory to perturb 
the original intention of the agent. With our approach, the agents bring 
obfuscating information. W e designate the approach Intention spreading 
and Intention Shrinking. 
• Anonymity in mobile agent systems. This overviews the solutions to 
anonymity, and our approach to make anonymous agents. 
• Issues that are remained unsolved, and are not addressed. This opens the 
active research directions in protecting the mobile agents. 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The organization of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, the basis of the attacks 
initiated by the malicious hosts and the basis of the security schemes to protect 
mobile agents are unfolded. The particular focuses of this thesis are described. 
They are confidentiality and anonymity. In Chapter 3，new methodologies to 
achieve confidentiality are discussed. The approaches are designated Intention 
spreading and Intention shrinking. They form one of the main contributions 
of this thesis. The content of this chapter is published in two papers, “ Pro-
tecting mobile agents against malicious hosts by Intention Spreading" [24] and 
“Intention Spreading: an extensible theme to protect mobile agents from read 
attack hoisted by malicious hosts" [25]. In Chapter 4, an integrated solution to 
anonymity in mobile agent systems is constructed. In Chapter 5, issues that are 
remained unsolved, and are not addressed are widely discussed. This includes a 
protocol in draft to optimize between two contrasting factors, security and per-
formance. The protocol is presented in a paper called，，A trust-level exchanging 
protocol in mobile agent systems for security and performance benefits" [26 . 
W e have the conclusions over the thesis document in the last chapter. 
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Understanding attacks and 
defense 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have introduced the mobile agent paradigm and 
identified the problem of protecting the mobile agent in hostile environment. In 
theory and in practice, the mobile agent is instructed to follow a set of decision 
logic to work on our behalf on the network. In some circumstances, the work 
delegated to the agent is security-sensitive. The hosts would gain exceptional 
benefits if they initiate attacks on the agent. If the agent is not protected in any 
context, it cannot survive and carry out its operations successfully. In this way, 
a number of schemes are employed to protect the mobile agents. To capture 
the whole scenario described above, a considerable body of work is already done 
to understand two aspects. One is on the attacks, one is on the defense. In 
the following sections, the significant research works on these two aspects are 
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surveyed in details. This serves as a foundation to illustrate the basis of attacks 
and the basis of defense we are going to rely on in the next few chapters. 
Our questions to the two aspects, attacks and defense, are to be answered in 
two separate sections. The questions on attacks are as follows. W h a t is referred 
as an attack? What is the basis of attacks theoretically? W h a t are the possible 
attacks in practice? The questions on defense are as follows. W h a t is referred 
as a defense? W h a t are we looking for in our defense schemes? W h a t are the 
existing technologies in offering defense in practice? 
2.2 Understanding attacks 
2.2.1 The meaning of an attack 
The problem of malicious hosts was identified and was under research within 
these few years, the meaning of an attack on the mobile agent has been estab-
lished. Generally speaking, an attack on the mobile agent means the additional 
malicious operations done on the agent in returning for any benefits. The at-
tack can be human-assisted or fully automatic. In real life, an attack can be 
any operations imaginable, ranging from the high-level analysis of agent to the 
low-level memory monitoring. Besides, the attack can be initiated by a single 
host, or can be initiated by a number of colluding hosts. An attacker means 
the party who initiates the attack. In this thesis, the attacker is mainly the 
malicious host. In most cases, the normal functioning of the agent would be 
affected under the attacks. 
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Figure 2.1: A picture of a Random Access Store Procedure plus Stack (RASPS). 
2.2.2 An abstract model of attacks 
W e know that any imaginable attacks would happen on the mobile agent when it 
is executed in the hostile environment. To be aware of the protection schemes, it 
is important to know all these attacks, but it is even more important to know the 
basis that derives these attacks. The model of attacks was firstly mentioned by 
Hohl [27]. His work is on the generalization of all possible attacks with the help 
of the machine model, the fundamental object in computer science to explain 
the working mechanism of a computer theoretically. This model serves as a basis 
to understand the attacks in the very fundamentals. 
In Hohl's model, the core entity, the attacker, is assumed to be a computer 
program that initiates all kinds of attacks on the mobile agent. Likewise, the 
mobile agent is also a self-contained computer program. A n abstract machine 
called the Random Access Stored Program plus Stack Machine (RASPS) is used 
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either to load the attacker program or the agent program. The R A S P S consists 
of a vector of memory cells, a stack, a stack pointer, and a program counter. 
It is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Like the general machine model, the memory 
cells are used to store the computer program once the program is loaded. The 
stack cells are used to store the temporary variables during the execution of 
the program. Conceptually, during the initialization of the agent platform, the 
attacker program is loaded into the attacker RASPS. W h e n the mobile agent 
arrives at the host, the agent is loaded into the host's memory. The situation 
is modeled as if the agent is loaded in the abstract RASPS. Figure 2.2 shows 
the illustration. In this way, the model is now simplified to have two abstract 
machines. One machine is loaded with the agent program, while the other 
is loaded with the attacker program. The attacker machine is armed with the 
external environment, like the system clock, the code library to access the system 
or to access other host specific information, to target at the mobile agent in agent 
machine, the victim. 
The fundamental behavior of an attacker can be visualized more clearly, 
thanks to the machine model defined above. As mentioned, the abstract agent 
machine is executed on the host, and the abstract attacker machine holds the 
environmental factors that the agent machine requires. The attacker RASPS, 
loaded with the attacker program, can fetch and store the content in the memory 
and stack of the agent R A S P S to its own stack. With the same idea, the attacker 
R A S P S can fetch and store the stack pointer and the program counter of the 
agent R A S P S too. W e can understand a typical attack using the following flow. 
1. Before a new statement of the agent program is executed, the attacker 
R A S P S fetch and decode the statement of the agent RASPS. 
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I A g e n t 、 f Attacker \ 
i Program J \ Program J 
• I 
Agent RASPS Attacker RASPS 
Mobile Agent Platform 
Figure 2.2: Two abstract machines. One is loaded with the agent program, one 
is loaded with the attacker program. 
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2. The attacker R A S P S stores the statement and the parameters of the agent 
R A S P S onto its own stack. 
3. The attacker R A S P S computes the future program counter of the agent 
R A S P S and stores the value on its own stack. 
4. The attacker R A S P S analyses the statement and executes the attacker 
program loaded in its memory. 
5. The attacker R A S P S executes the statement with the parameters stored 
on its stack. 
6. The attacker R A S P S stores the future program counter in its stack onto 
the program counter of the agent RASPS. 
7. Continue with the next cycle. 
In effect, the attacker program monitors the execution of every statement 
of the agent program. The attacker program can allow each statement to be 
executed as expected. O n the worse side, the attacker program can modify 
statements, can delete statements in the memory of agent RASPS. The attacker 
program can jump through execution within the statements selectively and can 
insert unexpected statements into the memory of agent RASPS. In this way, 
the mobile agent is entirely subordinate to the attacker. Program code can 
be inserted, modified, deleted, selectively executed. The vulnerabilities of the 
mobile agent to execute in the hostile environment are readily reflected. 
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address home = "PDA, sweet PDA"； 
money wallet = 20$; 
float maximumprice = 20.00$; 
good flowers = 10 red roses; 
address shoplist[] = empty list; 
int shoplistindex = 0; 
float bestprice = 20.00$; 
address bestshop = empty; 
Figure 2.3: A purchasing agent (data block). 
2.2.3 A survey of various attacks 
Hohl's model of attacks is illustrated above, in which the generalization of various 
attacks is made. This model is abstract enough to describe how and how much 
the various attacks could be. In the followings, we survey broadly on the possible 
attacks in practice [23] [27] - [30]. They can be thought as the instances of the 
abstract model. 
W e illustrate the possible practical attacks with a small purchasing agent, 
which is extracted from [27]. The purchasing agent visits a number of shops 
to ask for the lowest price of a bunch of flowers. W e represent the agent in 
its source code, with an associated data block. The source code governs the 
working mechanism of the agent while the data block stores some initial values 
or accumulated values in agent's itinerary. They are shown in Figure 2.3, 2.4. 
Masquerading 
The mobile agent host can masquerade as another host in the network so as to 
deceive the sender that the agent has arrived at the destination correctly. Using 
the example, the purchasing agent is supposed to arrive at a number of trusted 
hosts only. If the masquerading host intercepts the mobile agent in between the 
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1 public void startAgent(){ 
2 if (shoplist = = null) { 
3 shoplist = getTrader 0 .getProvidersOf(" Buy Flowers")； 
4 go (shoplist [1]); 
5 break; 
6 } 
7 if (shoplist [shoplistindex].askprice(flowers) < bestprice){ 
8 best price = shoplist [shoplistindex]. askprice (flowers)； 
9 bestshop = shoplist [shoplistindex]； 
10 } 
11 if (shoplistindex > (shoplist.length - 1)){ 
12 buy (bestshop,flowers, wallet); 
13 go (home); 
14 if (location.getAddress() = = home){ 
15 location.put (wallet)； 
16 } 
17 } 
18 go(shoplist [++shoplistindex]； 
19 } 
Figure 2.4: A purchasing agent (code block). 
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transmission, the mobile agent will treat the masquerading host as one of the 
trusted hosts. Being a trusted host, it is easier for the masquerading host to 
intrude the purchasing agent. Often, masquerading is followed by other attacks, 
to be detailed later. 
O n the other hand, the mobile agent host can masquerade as another host 
in the network so as to deceive the receiver that the agent is sent validly from a 
trusted host. This is similar to the above scenario where the receiving host will 
be at risk because it will receive an agent from an unknown source. The mas-
querading host can implant malicious code into the agent and infect successive 
hosts. 
Spying out and manipulating the agent 
This is obvious from the model that the mobile agent host can spy out the 
content of the agent without leaving any detectable traces. The mobile agent 
consists of the executable statements, the accumulated data and states. If any of 
them is spy out, it is the leak of privacy or the compromise of business strategy. 
Like in this case, the executable part of the agent contains the buying strategy, 
which is to buy because of the price. If the malicious host can spy out this 
strategy in advance, it can sacrifice the original price in order to win over other 
competing hosts. Accounting the data portion, the purchasing agent uses it to 
store the list of shops it has visited. The malicious host can know and analyze 
the habit of the user that creates the agent. Further statistical inference can 
reflect the buying habit of the user. By probing into the dynamic states, like the 
stack pointer, the program counter, the host can grasp the point of execution in 
memory, and the point of storage in stack. Such a grasp keeps track of the flow 
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of agent execution. 
Almost in parallel, the mobile agent can manipulate the code at the same 
time. Manipulation can be even worse than spying alone. By manipulation, 
the host can modify the agent's content. For example, the host can modify the 
executable code and make it prefer one particular company, independent of any 
strategy inside the agent. The host can also implant a virus-equivalent program 
slice into the executable portion. Accounting the data portion, the host can cut 
down the shop list after setting the offer of the local flower provider as the best 
offer. By changing the program counter and stack pointer, the host can decide 
the next instruction to execute and the next address to fetch from the stack. 
Spying out and manipulating the agent communication 
The mobile agent host can spy out the communication between agents. As 
mentioned in the model, the agent program needs to pass through the external 
environment to access other objects, like the third parties. However, the attacker 
program can monitor all of the communication. If the agent is required to 
negotiate with other agents in the host to complete its tasks, its communications 
can be spy out. 
Apart from spying out, the host can also manipulate the agent communica-
tion. Using the example, the host will contact the host that provides the lowest 
price by a "buy" operation. The initiating host can, for instance, redirect the 
buying interaction to another shop, or it can simply intrude the buy operation 
by contaminating some of the parameters of the buy operation. 
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Inappropriate execution of the agent 
It is obvious from the model that the host controls completely the execution of 
the agent. For instance, the host can delay the execution of the purchasing agent 
or replace the agent's code in memory by some d u m m y code. The agent is stayed 
live-locked because it is not doing its own task. Besides, the host can change 
the semantics of its interpreter and make the program statements be interpreted 
differently. The host can jump within the executable code to execute the agent 
selectively. If system calls are made on the host, the host can return incorrect 
results to the agent. Using the example, the get Providers () and get Address () 
are the system calls. Returning incorrect results can ruin the operations of the 
agent. At worst, the host can terminate the execution of the agent prematurely 
and make it stopped half way the execution without migration. 
Repudiation 
The mobile agent host can deny from having provided service to the mobile 
agent. Using the example, the host can deny from having provided information 
like flower's price and so on to the agent. The host can deny from having received 
money in the buying process even the transaction is dealt. 
2.3 Understanding defense 
2.3.1 The meaning of defense 
W e understand defense as the way to protect mobile agents from the various 
attacks derived from the attack model. Defense, or say, the protection scheme, 
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is mainly described in two senses: prevention and detection. Prevention is to 
employ mechanisms to make the attacks difficult to happen. Contrast to pre-
vention, detection is post-mortem. Detection is to employ mechanisms to detect 
any abnormal operations having done on the mobile agent. Prevention tries to 
eradicate attacking attempts, while detection tries to deter attacking attempts. 
2.3.2 Security requirements of defense 
Once we are aware of the attacks on the mobile agent, we are ready to develop 
protection schemes to protect the mobile agent. There are many approaches to 
develop protection schemes. W e can pinpoint one particular attack and develop 
the countermeasures of the attack. W e can aggregate a number of attacks, an-
alyze their similarities, and develop the countermeasures to deter the group of 
attacks. Either approach would work. In order to understand the complete pic-
ture of protection schemes, it is important to be clear what we are looking for. 
This is understood as the security requirements to be attained by the mobile 
agent when it is dispatched to the network. Five important security require-
ments, in the agent's perspective, are detailed as follows. The requirements are 
generally agreed upon in the agent community as the basic requirements the 
protection schemes should comply with partly or wholly [23] [31". 
Integrity 
The protection scheme should protect the mobile agent from unauthorized mod-
ification, and to keep it intact wholly. The protection scheme should have mech-
anisms to prevent agent-related information or agent communication from mod-
ification, and to detect any modifications once happened. 
26 
Chapter' 2 Understanding attacks and defense 
Accountability 
The protection scheme should allow actions done on the agent be accountable 
for non-repudiation purpose. For instance, if the above security requirements 
are violated by the hosts, the protection scheme should have mechanisms in 
recording any malicious actions. This serves as the after-the-fact logging to 
trace and identify any malicious parties. 
Confidentiality 
The protection scheme should protect the mobile agent from eavesdropping. 
Eavesdropping is possible in many places, with the most obvious one on the 
mobile agent's content. This includes the executable code, the data and the 
states of the mobile agent. Intruders analyze the agent for its decision logic 
information, for its in-transit information and for its execution flow informa-
tion. To account for agent-related information, agent's itinerary, audit logging 
should also be kept confidential. Moreover, eavesdropping is possible in agent-
to-agent communication and agent-to-platform communication. They should 
also be protected. Since this requirement concerns seriously on the private data, 
it is sometimes called data privacy. Or, a better term is agent privacy. 
Anonymity 
The protection scheme should ensure the identities of the agent owner not ex-
posed to the public. In a general sense, anonymity hides the identities of the 
concerned parties. In mobile agent system, anonymity means to hide the where-
abouts of the mobile agent too. The masked mobile agent, not only hides its 
identity, but also hides the hosts it has visited. 
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Availability 
The protection scheme should ensure that the mobile agent is allocated fairly 
and faithfully with host's resources. W h e n the mobile agent arrives at a host, it 
will request for resources like network connectivity, file access, and code library 
access. If the resources are not allocated under a fair schedule, the mobile agent 
is resided without doing any good. The host can insert d u m m y execution code 
to delay the agent from finishing its task. The protection scheme should also 
guarantee the quality of service provided to the agent. The agent should not be 
live-locked nor dead-locked. 
2.3.3 A survey of protection schemes 
With an aim to achieve the above security requirements, researchers worldwide 
have proposed many schemes. Each scheme has its own merits in protecting the 
mobile agents, either in the sense of prevention or in the sense of detection. The 
schemes are described in the following sections, and their practicalities are also 
discussed. 
Schemes to provide integrity 
To protect mobile agents from unauthorized modifications, cryptographic prim-
itives like digital signatures, one way hash functions are used. The schemes 
mentioned in [38] [39] are detailed in the followings. 
Partial Result Authentication Code (PRAC) is suggested in [38] to provide 
forward integrity of the partial result obtained by the agent. Forward integrity 
means the results obtained in the previous hosts cannot be modified. This 
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scheme is to encapsulate the partial results by using cryptographic checksums. 
It requires the agent and its originator to maintain a list of secret keys used in 
the P R A C computation. The key is used to encrypt results obtained at each 
host and it is destroyed when the agent migrates to the next host. Through the 
signed partial results, we can identify the first malicious host and trust only the 
results obtained before that host. A n enhanced scheme for public verification is 
also suggested in [38]. The weakness of this approach is that colluding attacks 
may be possible. T w o or more colluding, and successive, malicious hosts can 
modify the partial result and sign it, yet to deceive the originator the partial 
result is valid. 
Another approach is suggested in [39] to improve over the above P R A C 
approach. Apart from encapsulating results at each host, this approach suggests 
to chain the encapsulated results with the identities of the previous visited hosts 
and the subsequent host. The host digitally signs the entry with its private key, 
and uses a secure hash function to link results and the concerned identities. This 
builds on top of forward integrity, and prevents a host to modify the entries in 
the chain through collusion. In [39], message authentication code (MAC) is also 
suggested to replace digital signatures，also supported with public verification. 
The aim of the above schemes is to prevent unauthorized modifications on 
agent's partial result at each host. The above two schemes ensure the partial 
results are valid until the first detectable malicious host. This is the notion 
of forward integrity. Approaches like mutual itinerary recording, and record-
ing with replication and voting [46] [47] guarantee the computation integrity by 
identifying trusted hosts. Both approaches track any anomalies on the hosts 
and mark them as un-trusted hosts. If the hosts are un-trusted, computation 
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integrity is not ensured. A n emerging approach called dynamic software wa-
termarking [74] [75] is under development to provide computation integrity. A 
special data structure W is embedded into a program. The execution of the 
program will leave detectable traces into the data structure W . But an onlooker 
cannot know the exact place of the watermark in the program. The returned 
watermark can be analyzed to detect any malicious modification. Research on 
software watermarking is still preliminary, more research work is needed. 
Schemes to provide accountability 
To trace afterward the computations done by the mobile agents, many schemes 
are suggested [40] - [42]. The first two is on the verification of the execution 
traces done by the hosts [40] [41], while the last one is to check the state of the 
mobile agent for any inconsistencies [42]. They are detailed as follows. 
Cryptographic traces suggested by Vigna in [40] is to detect malicious hosts 
for any suspicious computation. The scheme requires each host to construct an 
execution logging, or called tracing, when it executes the mobile agent. The 
tracing includes a sequence of statement executed by the host, and any related 
information obtained. The tracing is then hashed and carried along the agent's 
itinerary. If the agent owner is suspicious about the computation, he asks the 
agent host for the complete execution tracing to simulate the execution again. In 
case the simulation is the same as that obtained in the hash, the host performs 
properly. If not, the host is malicious. Besides, a trusted third party is used to 
store the sequence of trace summaries for the agent's itinerary. This prevents 
the execution tracing from erasing. However, this scheme is deficient because 
the execution logs are proportional to the number of program statements and 
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number of hosts to visit. Hence, the logging is large in size. Besides, the scheme 
does not support multi-threaded agents too. 
To make the size of execution tracing short, another approach is suggested 
in [41]. Suppose the program is denoted by x, the execution trace is denoted 
by y. W e can check the predicate p(x,y) as the committed execution by the 
hosts. This scheme improves the above scheme because the server sends the 
holographic proof y' instead. The holographic proof, y', is much shorter than 
the original proof. The agent owner only needs to look at a number of bits 
of y' to confirm p(x,y) is correct. This minimizes the overhead of execution 
tracing. The security of this method depends on the general cryptographic 
assumptions, and the private information retrieval techniques used in database 
systems. Although the authors have not mentioned the way to construct the 
holographic proof, there exist short proofs that are of size sub-linear resp. poly-
logarithmic in the size of the mobile agent's running time. At this moment, the 
feasibility of this approach is speculative. It takes much more research to justify 
the theoretical sayings. 
To trace any alternations on the state of the agent, state appraisal function 
is used in [42]. State appraisal function lies above the lower authentication 
layer, and provides input to an authorization mechanism. The agent that holds 
the state appraisal function requests the permissions through the function, the 
authorization mechanism on the execution host determine which of the requested 
permissions will be granted. If a host misuses the agent and alters the state to 
make the agent harmful - either to the sites it visits later or to the user who 
dispatches it - can be reflected through the function too. However, this approach 
does not work always since some state alternations cannot be easily detected. 
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Schemes to provide confidentiality 
Several schemes are proposed for confidentiality purpose [32] - [36]. A n ad-hoc 
method is suggested in [32], while cryptographic approaches are mentioned in 
33] - [36]. They are described as follows. 
Time limited blackbox security proposed by Hohl in [32] is an ad-hoc method 
to protect mobile agents from eavesdropping. This approach is based on obfusca-
tion of source code. It is supposed that there is a mental model that is the easiest 
way to comprehend the source code of mobile agent. If the mental model is cor-
rupted, the intruders will need much more time to comprehend, and hence the 
effect of confidentiality. To corrupt the mental model, the method is to scramble 
the code in such a way that no one is able to gain a complete understanding 
of its function. The techniques mentioned are like variable re-composition, con-
version of control flow elements into value-dependent jumps and deposited keys. 
After conversion, the agent appears to be a blackbox to the intruders, and it 
becomes much more difficult to decode and analyze. Hohl also suggests put the 
time factor onto the agent, and makes the agent a time-limited one. This means 
that the computation carried by the agent is valid within a period of time. If the 
intruders cannot understand the blackbox within that time interval, the attack 
is claimed void. To summarize, this is a soft approach to provide confidential-
ity. However, the approach is inadequate because the obfuscation applied on 
the agent cannot be automated, and cannot be provably measured. Besides, 
time-limitedness requires synchronized clocks that the hosts conform. 
Computing with encrypted function proposed by Sander and Tschudin in 
33] is a cryptographic method to protect mobile agents from eavesdropping. 
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The approach is to encrypt the functions in the mobile agent. This is differ-
ent from traditional encryption to encrypt passive data, in which the data after 
encryption is meaningless, the functions after encryption are still usable. The 
agent-to-host relationship is modeled as the interaction between Alice and Bob. 
Figure 2.5 shows the picture, where P means the program that implements the 
function. Suppose Alice has an algorithm to compute function f. Bob has in-
put X and he is willing to compute f(x) for Alice. However, Alice does not 
want Bob to learn anything substantial about function f. Alice transforms the 
original function f to the encrypted function E(f), and sends it to Bob. Bob 
inputs X，and sends it to Alice. Alice then extracts f(x) from E(f(x)) by means 
of homomorphism. Since Bob receives the encrypted version of function f, he 
does not know what the function is doing. If function f is originally a signature 
algorithm with an embedded key, the agent can sign information remotely with-
out revealing its private key. This approach is, described by many researchers, 
promising because it applies the cryptographic primitives systematically on an 
agent. The strength is easily measurable. However, this approach currently 
supports polynomials and rational functions only. If the program implements 
security-sensitive functions other than polynomials and rational functions, the 
functions cannot be encrypted at this moment. 
Another similar approach that uses encryption is proposed by Loureio and 
Molva in [34]. This approach employs another encryption that is based on the 
intractability assumption of coding theory. At first, functions in the agent are 
modeled as Boolean circuits that are represented as a matrix with number of 
rows equals the number of inputs, number of columns equals the number of 
outputs. Figure 2.6 shows the picture. Assume the matrix is denoted by F. 
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Figure 2.5: Computing with encrypted function, by Sander and Tschudin. 
The encryption is done by transforming F to F' where F, equals F G P + E. G 
is a generating matrix for an [n，k,d] Goppa code C. P is a random permutation 
matrix and E is a random matrix with null columns for future decoding. G，P 
and E are kept secret by the sender Alice. Transformed matrix F，is sent to 
Bob, and at times Bob inputs his data x. Alice gets back the matrix xF' and 
multiplies the received matrix by The received y becomes xFG + 
and the latter term is correctable in coding theory. In this way, only x F G is 
remained unsolved. Knowing the inverse of G, Alice gets back xF finally. This 
approach also offers measurable security strength since the encryption is based 
on the secure McEliece scheme [37]. However, there is no known method to 
relate functions in a program to its Boolean circuit equivalent. 
A number of methods is suggested by Riodan and Schneier to generate keys 
for encrypting, and decrypting, the static portion of the agent in [35]. To conceal 
the static portion conditionally, the encrypted part should be not revealed unless 
the host is permitted to do so. The decrypting key is based on temporal，spatial 
or operational factors. For example, an agent asks for a string match in the 
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Figure 2.6: Computing with encrypted function, by Loureio and Molva. 
database, and the decrypting key will be generated if the string matches. A n 
agent polls the newsgroup for a particular keyword, and a portion of code will 
be decrypted for host execution. The environmental factors decide when and 
whether the encrypted portion to be revealed to the host. Besides, authors in 
35] also suggest some time-based key generations. The key will be valid before 
or after a particular time, with the help of a trusted third party. The former 
one is called forward-time construction, the latter one is called backward-time 
construction. They can also be nested to ensure the key is valid within an 
interval of time. With the above useful keys, the private portion of the agent 
is concealed and revealed conditionally. However, the encrypted agent is biased 
for agent security, and the host may be at risk if the encrypted agent is actually 
a directed virus, as claimed in the paper. Besides, the schemes mentioned have 
the side effects like explicit on-going agent to third party communications, which 
consume network and computational resources. 
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Sliding encryption proposed by Young and Yung in [36] is to provide en-
cryption for small amounts of plain-text yielding small amounts of cipher-text. 
The agent carries the public key of the originator, and along the path, it uses 
the key to encrypt any information accumulated. W h e n the agent returns, the 
information is decrypted using the private key. The authors in [36] suggest an al-
gorithm to encrypt the small amount of information efficiently. With the special 
data structured mentioned in the paper, the agent's itinerary can be partially 
concealed and the agent becomes less traceable. This approach provides confi-
dentiality to the accumulating data, but cannot be applicable to the executable 
code since the code will be revealed to the host for execution. 
The aim of the above schemes is to make the agent difficult to comprehend, in 
terms of its data and its code. Time limited blackbox security simply messes up 
the program. T w o approaches use computing with encrypted functions (CEF) to 
convert the original program to an encrypted one, but yet executable. They are 
suitable for non-static part of the agent. Other two approaches use conditional 
and partial encryption to conceal the agent as much as possible, and to reveal 
it until certain conditions hold. They are suitable for static part of the agent. 
The non-static part and static part of the agent are described in Chapter 3. 
Schemes to provide anonymity 
Anonymity is sometimes not taken as a security requirement if identity infor-
mation is not important. At the time of writing this thesis, few schemes are 
derived to achieve anonymity [48] [49]. In [49]，onion-like data structure is used 
to protect the agent's itinerary from wholly known to the remote hosts. Without 
any protection, the itinerary is in its atomic version, that is the concatenation 
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of IP-addresses of the remote hosts. With the onion-like data structure, the 
itinerary is encrypted layer by layer. The next host information is revealed as 
long as the remote host has the correct secret key to decrypt. This minimizes the 
whereabouts information exposed to the remote hosts. In [48], secure hardware 
is used to protect the whole agent, including the itinerary. It is explained later. 
Schemes to provide availability 
Several schemes are derived to ensure the host will allocate the resources fairly 
and allocate with quality of service for the mobile agents [43]. The work in [43 
assumes that the hosts follow the resource allocation scheme faithfully, without 
mechanisms to prevent hosts from being malicious. The scheme is detailed 
below. 
In [43], a scheduling scheme for allocating resources to a mix of real-time 
and non real-time mobile programs is presented. Mobile programs, for example 
mobile agents, can specify their constraints in requesting for resources. They 
can specify the lower bound, weight, share and deadline for the schedulable 
unit of the host's CPU. The host adjusts with its own constraints to allocate 
C P U resources to the mobile agent. With both constraints set by the client and 
the host, the scheduling scheme addresses the security and quality of service. 
By security, resources are not dragged down by the mobile agents. By Q〇S， 
resources are scheduled to the mobile programs with a compromised amount. 
In this scheme, we depend on the proper behavior of the hosts to maintain the 
quality of service. The scheme does not detect hosts that do not achieve certain 
quality of service when the agent is returned. 
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Figure 2.7: CryPO protocol for achieving cryptographically protected objects. 
Schemes to meet all requirements 
Tamper-resistant hardware is suggested in [44] [45] to support all the security 
requirements listed above. They are explained below. 
Cryptographically protected objects are proposed by Wilhelm in [44]. The 
scheme requires to build a tamper proof environment (TPE) as a full execution 
environment for mobile agents, which cannot be inspected of and tampered with. 
See Figure 2.7. T P E holds a public key and private key pair. Public key is used 
by other hosts to encrypt the mobile agentwhile private key is used by T P E to 
decrypt mobile agents. Private key is generated by T P E manufacturer (TM). 
T P E is hooked up with the host computer as a tamper-proof device. Suppose 
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there is an object user, a user asking for a mobile agent, in the host computer. 
It is required to prove to other parties that its host computer has hooked up 
with a trustworthy TPE. It asks T M to generate a certificate that describes 
some information about the TPE, manufacturer, guarantees provided, and T P E 
public key. To ensure it is a statement committed by T M , it is digitally signed 
with T M private key for public verification. W h e n the object provider, OP, is 
asked to migrate the mobile agent from its home machine to this host computer. 
It first obtains the certificate and use T P E public key to encrypt the mobile 
agent. The object user, upon receiving the agent, cannot decrypt it. It is finally 
uploaded to the adhering TPE. The T P E decrypts the agent using its private 
key and obtains the executable object. The object is eventually started on the 
T P E and can interact with the local environment of object user. This approach 
can be applied generally for mobile code technologies, not necessarily mobile 
agents. Its security relies on the tamper proof hardware device that is in the 
lowest level and any security breach will be of high price and will make T M 
aware of if T M updates T P E in the future. T w o limitations of this scheme are 
found. First, it requires the tamper proof hardware device. This is not suitable 
to the wide scalability of an open system. Second, it is hard to describe the 
TPE's guarantees quantitatively inside a certificate given to the object user for 
object provider's verification. In [45], Yee suggests another similar approach by 
using secure coprocessor. 
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2.4 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we have answered the questions raised previously. In terms of 
attacks, we have gone through the meaning, the basis and the possibilities. In 
terms of defense, we have gone through the meaning, the requirements and the 
existing schemes. W e have established a solid framework to explain two key 
aspects: attacks and defense. 
By analyzing the protection schemes mentioned above, we can answer the 
following questions. What are impossible to solve? What are possible to solve? 
W h a t have been solved by the existing schemes? What have not been solved by 
the existing schemes? 
Some security attacks are not possible to solve, those attacks possible to 
solve are suggested above. In [31] [50], issues that are impossible to solve are 
described. They are not even addressed in the above protection schemes. 
• Verify that an interpreter is untampered. 
• Prevent, not only detect, execution anomaly of the interpreter. 
• Ensure the host to execute an agent to its completion. 
• Ensure an agent can be distinguished from a clone. 
Among the five security requirements, some are satisfactorily achieved, some 
are still open for research. The five security requirements are integrity, account-
ability, confidentiality, anonymity and availability. Integrity and accountability 
are basically solved, with future enhancements on more efficient signature, and 
shorter traceable proof. Tamper-proof device is aimed to satisfy all security 
requirements. However, it is not suitable for deployment in open systems. 
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Confidentiality, anonymity, and availability do not have an all-around solu-
tion. Currently, schemes offering confidentiality have no problems to protect 
static executable code or results, but do not have complete solutions to pro-
tect non-static part. Obfuscation and computing with encrypted functions offer 
some promises. Anonymity is only weakly addressed in literature [48] [49], it 
carries momentum to become important. More extensive work should be done 
on achieving agent anonymity. For availability issues, current schemes rely on 
the hosts to follow some scheduling schemes in order to maintain certain Quality 
of Service (QOS). The schemes cannot report if the resources are allocated to 
the execution of agent exactly and detect malicious hosts if any. This should 
also be adjusted. 
In the coming chapters, focus will be put to supplement schemes that provide 
confidentiality and anonymity. Issues on achieving availability are left open. W e 
will show that confidentiality and anonymity are coupled in some scale. 
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Confidentiality in mobile agent 
systems 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an important member of the security requirements, confidential-
ity, is pinpointed. To discuss confidentiality, we categorize a mobile agent into 
two parts: static and non-static. Static ones refer to the portion that involves 
no further participation in future agent execution. For instance, information 
collected at each host, that are not used by its neighboring hosts, are static in 
nature. Non-static ones refer to the portions that are involved in future agent 
execution. For instance, the executable code accompanied by the agent along 
the path is understood as non-static in nature. 
Schemes to achieve confidentiality have been widely proposed; yet, most of 
them are dedicated to the static portion. In Chapter 2, we have mentioned 
existing schemes to achieve confidentiality on the static portion [35] [36]. In 
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35], environmental keys are prepared to encrypt the static portion of the agent. 
Encrypted portion, both code and data, can be decrypted if some environmen-
tal factors are found on the executing hosts. In [36], an optimized encryption 
technique is proposed to encrypt the static portion practically. The technique is 
based on the R S A asymmetric crypto-system. The two proposed schemes offer 
provable confidentiality to the static portion of the agent. 
Confidentiality to the non-static portion is a new security challenge. In clas-
sical data security, we reveal everything as long as two end parties are recognized 
as trusted. In mobile agent security, two-way end-to-end trust relationship is not 
assumed. W e want the mobile agent to be executed in the remote host, yet, we 
do not want the hosts to learn anything substantial about the agent, especially 
the non-static portion. Intuitively, this is contradictory since the one that exe-
cutes the agent can know everything about the agent, by simple extrapolation 
of the attack model mentioned in Chapter 2. 
Several schemes attempt to solve this new confidentiality problem. In Chap-
ter 2, we have mentioned these schemes [32] - [34] and have discussed their prac-
ticalities. Time limited blackbox security [32] and computing with encrypted 
function [33] [34] are limited in different aspects. To supplement part of their 
inadequacies, Intention Spreading and Intention Shrinking are proposed and 
detailed in this chapter [24] [25 . 
3.2 Motivations 
What are the risks if the confidentiality of non-static portion is not taken into 
account? It is lightly mentioned in Chapter 2. The risks are presented more 
43 
Chapter 3 Confidentiality in mobile agent systems 
exhaustively in the followings. 
3.2.1 Program comprehension 
The malicious hosts are motivated to read the content of the mobile agent for 
benefits. Program comprehension can compromise the confidentiality of non-
static portion of the agent. For example, the hosts can read the best price 
obtained by a shopping agent in the itinerary halfway. The hosts can also 
read agent's decision logic to understand its buying strategy. By learning more 
about the agent, the malicious host is in a better position than other hosts in a 
competitive environment. 
Many programming languages can be used to compose mobile agents [56 • 
The languages not only differ in their functions to provide, but also differ in their 
forms to distribute agents. Three main kinds of distribution are possible. They 
are, namely, the source code, the intermediate code and the compiled native 
binary code. These three kinds of agent distribution are vulnerable to program 
comprehension to various extents. 
Agent distributed in source code is easily compromised under program com-
prehension. Source code distribution is advantageous in some sense. First, the 
mobile agent is encapsulated in relatively small amount of code. Second, only a 
compatible interpreter is required on the remote hosts for agent execution. Safe 
Tel in D'Agents project and Ara project are examples that employ source code 
distribution for their agents [51] [52]. However, source code distribution is risky 
since it is the most primitive and readily readable form. The source code can be 
manually analyzed or automatically analyzed by program comprehension tools 
like program slicers [56] - [60'. 
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Agent distributed in intermediate code or compiled code succumb to the 
same attack after reverse engineering. Agents in their source code require fur-
ther compilation before they occupy an execution space on the host. This is 
inherently slow. Intermediate code or compiled code solves this problem. I B M 
Java Aglets, General Magic Telescript [54] [55] dispatch agents in intermedi-
ate code while Omniware [61] represents agents in Just-in-time (JIT) compiled 
code. Although the agent is binary, obfuscated, it is not absolutely safe. Tools 
are available to de-compile the binary code [62] - [64]. Once the source code is 
revealed partially, program comprehension is the same as if it is the source. 
3.2.2 Black-box testing 
Similar to program comprehension, black-box testing casts the attack by spec-
ifying inputs and observing outputs. A self-contained mobile agent appears to 
be a black-box to outsiders. Although the code and data are principally "invis-
ible" for attackers, black-boxes can be attacked by means of testing attacks. A 
black-box testing attack executes an agent several times with different input pa-
rameters. After each execution, the attacker observes the effect, either explicit 
results like output values or characteristic “ activity pattern". Understanding the 
relationship between inputs and outputs, the decision logic of the agent can be 
rebuilt. This is equivalent, to some extent, to comprehend the program directly. 
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3.3 Theory 
Schemes proposed in [32] - [34] have their limitations in overcoming the above 
attacks. These will be detailed later. In this section, we will propose an alter-
native scheme that protects mobile agents. The theoretical background will be 
given first. 
3.3.1 Assumptions 
W e have a number of assumptions for the theory to be presented: 
• Mobile agents are software entities that travel through the network on our 
behalf. 
• Mobile agents are written in modules or part of them can be recognized 
as modules. 
• Mobile agents and remote hosts are mutually distrusting. 
• Each remote host is supposed to execute the mobile agent once. After 
it has finished the execution, the agent is updated or incremented with 
the host-specific information. Agent migrates with the updated state and 
information to the next host. 
3.3.2 Entropy of mobile agents 
W e have designed a new metric in measuring the mobile agent, and it is used 
to measure how specific the tasks a mobile agent is to carry out. Assume that 
there exists a finite value N that defines the number of possible intentions of 
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mobile agents conclusively. Let X be a random variable denoting the intention 
of the mobile agent, i.e. we have: 
X G {XL, ...^xN} 
The probability for an event xi to occur is defined as p(xi), i.e. we have: 
咖 ） = 1 
l<i<7V 
H o w will the program be classified as with intention X={xi}, where i 二 
1,2,…,N ？ By assumption, the mobile agent is divided into modules, and each 
of the modules does a task. W e tentatively divide modules into three classes: 
1. C o m m o n class: modules that are common to all N intentions. 
2. Shared class: modules that are shared by a subset of intentions; the size 
of the subset is between 1 and N non-inclusively. 
3- Specific class: modules that are specific to only one intention out of N 
intentions. 
For an unknown mobile agent, we want to determine its intention in a prob-
abilistic sense. Suppose there are K modules in the mobile agents, we can 
categorize these K modules into common class, shared class or specific class. To 
account for the occurrence of an intention xi in the mobile agent, we count the 
number of modules that are attributed to intention xi out of the K modules. If K 
modules all belong to specific class (specific to intention xi), intention xi occurs 
with probability one. If K modules all belong to common class (non-specific to 
any intentions), each intention will have the same probability to occur. If part of 
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the K modules is categorized to shared class, several intentions in the spectrum, 
from xl to xN, will be more probable to occur than the rest. 
It is a common consensus that malicious hosts would attack certain mobile 
agents more often than others. For instance, a mobile agent asking for price is 
more likely to be attacked than a mobile agent collecting academic articles. In 
this way, knowing what specific task a mobile agent is doing is the ultimate goal 
of the malicious hosts. The easier the host can understand the original intention, 
the more insecure the mobile agent is. 
W e use entropy to measure the intention of a mobile agent. As mentioned, 
X is a random variable denoting the intention of the mobile agent within a finite 
number of intentions N. Occurrence of event xi is of probability p(xi). The 
entropy H(X) is given by [65]: 
HW 二 E 岭 咖 仍 
l<i<N 叫 
In Information Theory, entropy H(X) measures the amount of information 
given by a random variable X. The higher the entropy, the more information the 
random variable X is offering. The maximum is achieved when all events in the 
set X occur with the same probability. At the maximum, we are uncertain about 
the occurrence of any particular events. Assume that the mobile agent originally 
carries one specific intention, the entropy is zero. If the entropy is increased, 
more information is exposed to the hosts, and it is more difficult for the remote 
host to guess the original intention. Assume that the mobile agent originally 
carries several intentions, the entropy is less than or equal to the maximum 
entropy, which is logqN. If the entropy is decreased, less information is exposed 
to the hosts, and it is also the same difficult to guess the original intention. 
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Therefore, our aims to protect the original intentions are as follows. 
• Increase the entropy when original intention is focused. The technique to 
increase the entropy is designated as Intention Spreading 
• Decrease the entropy when original intentions are diverse. The technique 
to decrease the entropy is designated as Intention Shrinking 
By insertion, intention spreading can be achieved. By splitting, intention 
shrinking can be achieved. They are shown below. 
3.3.3 Intention spreading by insertion 
By insertion, we mean to introduce noisy code to the mobile agent. Suppose 
we have a mobile agent with intention represented by random variable X, we 
add noisy code to it, and obtain an agent with intention represented by random 
variable Z (Figure 3.1). Similarly, random variable Z is confined within the N 
intentions. 
Z G … ， 洲 
The spectrum of intention in the original mobile agent is characterized by 
its entropy H(X). If the mobile agent targets at a particular intention sharply, 
the probability of xi to occur is one，and H(X) equals zero. If the mobile agent 
targets at a whole range of intentions, the probability of each xi, where i=l’2,…N, 
to occur is 1/N, and H(X) is maximized to log2N. By considering the case 
between these two extremes, the mobile agent targets at several intentions in 
the spectrum and have modules in specific class, shared class and common class. 
If we strategically introduce noisy code to the specific class modules and shared 
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i Agent (X) I — + Agent (Z) I vly f \ J 
Noisy Code 
Figure 3.1: The original mobile agent, whose intention is represented by random 
variable X, is transformed to a mobile agent, whose intention is represented by 
random variable Z，by adding noisy code. 
class modules, the intentions will be neutralized to non-specific class modules. 
For example, the class is downcast from specific class to shared class and common 
class，and from shared class to common class. If noisy code is added to the 
spectrum with zero entropy, the spectrum is spread. Ideally, maximum entropy 
is achieved if a complete spread spectrum is formed. A n illustration is found in 
Figure 3.2. 
H o w should the noisy code look like? Basically, the noisy code should be 
complementary code to the individual module. For example, we have n mod-
ules, out of a total of K modules, Xi, X。, for intention spreading, the 
complementary noisy code Y^ is: (negation is a kind of complement) 
= negation{Xi), where i = 1,2,…nandn < K 
Suppose the mobile agent is characterized by random variable Z after noisy 
code is added. If, originally, K modules associate the agent with intention xi 
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Mobile agent with a 
pointed intention 
J 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mobile agent with several 
intentions | | | 
J 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ideal: Mobile agent with a 
whole range of intentions 
—— 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Figure 3.2: The agent's intention is defocused and is spread across a number of 
intentions with non-zero probabilities. The ideal transformation is to transform 
the original intention to all possible intentions with equal probability, and to 
make a spread spectrum. 
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with probability one. But now, only (K-n) modules fall into the specific class, 
and n modules distribute between shared class and common class. In this way, 
we cannot say for sure that the mobile agent is targeting at any intentions over Z. 
In short, our approach to spread the original intention is to convert specific class 
of modules to shared class, or one-step further, to common class by introducing 
noisy code. 
Ill the conversion, the coverage of modules over the intentions is enlarged. 
Modules that are originally specific to intention xi become the shared class over 
other intentions. The probability for other intentions to occur is increased. Oiir 
goal to spread the original intention is achieved. Entropy H(Z) is bounded within 
the following range. 
H„un = 0 < H{Z) < H,隱 二 loq^N 
3.3.4 Intention shrinking by splitting 
By splitting, we nieaii to divide the original mobile agent into a group of collab-
m-ating- agents. Suppose we have a mobile agent whose iriteiitioii is represented 
hy randoin variable X. It is split to a iiiiniher of collaborating agents called Yi, 
\vh(、re i=l二),..…M. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. By some operations, X can 
1)(、const met 0(1. 
X = r, G)'>G---ey.\f 
Iiitentioii shrinking is actually the re\-prse of iiitonlioii ‘sj)i-f>a(liiig. In inteii-
tioii spreading, we introduce noisy code to transform tlio chuss of modules from 
specific、to shared, or ovoii to coniinoii. The transforiiialion makes the spectrum 
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Figure 3.3: The original mobile agent, with random variable X, is divided into 
a number of agents, with random variables Y\ to Ym-
of intention more spread. In intention shrinking, we make the spectrum less 
spread by converting the class of modules in reverse. 
Suppose the original mobile is diverse with a number of intentions, and sev-
eral iiiteiitioiis will occur with iioii-zero probabilities. If we strategically divide 
the mobile agent into several mobile agents, and make the original shared and 
commoii class modules become more specific. In this case, the class of modules 
is up-ca.st froTii the coiiiinoii class, shared class to the specific class. The original 
spec.tnnn of intention is replaced by a groiip of spectnims each with zero or 
almost zero entropy. An illustration is found in Figure 3.4. 
Since iiiteiilioii shrinking works in reverse as in iiitentioi】 spreading，the split-
ting should extract the original iiileiitions and form an agent for each intention. 
After extraction, each inohilp agent is carried witli a spectnirn of lower entropy, 
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Ideal: Mobile agent with a 
pointed intention 
f � 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mobile agent with several 
intentions | | | 
个 」 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mobile agent with a whole 
range of intentions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Figure 3.4: The agent's intention is shrink from the original spread spectrum. 
The ideal transformation is to a spectrum of zero entropy. 
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which is different from the original one. In order to prevent the host from as-
sembling the split agents, the relationship of the collaborating agents should be 
further obfuscated. To summarize, intention shrinking occurs if the followings 
hold. 
• The mobile agent is split 
• The split mobile agents are not seemingly in collaboration. Anonymous 
mobile agents can be applied to de-correlate their cooperation. 
3.3.5 Nested spreading and shrinking 
Intention spreading and intention shrinking can be further nested to protect the 
original intention. This is illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
3.4 Implementation possibilities 
3.4.1 Addition of irrelevant variables and conditional state-
ments 
Suppose a mobile agent is dispatched to collect the price of a D V D player by 
visiting several online retailers. The retailers are competitive to each other in 
order to attract the buyers. Malicious retailers do not mind to lower their price 
to attract the buyers once they know the previous bottom-price. W h e n the 
mobile agent has visited several hosts, it has the following data block and code 
block (Figure 3.6). 
This might be obvious to the malicious hosts that the mobile agent is bar-
gaining for a price no better than $3000. The mobile agent brings solely a 
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Figure 3.5: The spectrum of the original mobile agent is in upper left corner. 
If the spectrum is spread by intention spreading, the spectrum will change in 
the horizontal direction. If the spectrum is shrink by intention spreading, a 
number of spectrums are formed in the vertical direction. Intention spreading 
and shrinking can be further nested. 
Data block: 
money bestprice = 3000$; 
address bestshop = "SuperShop"; 
Code block: 
1 if (shoplist[shoplistindex].askprice(player) < bestprice) 
2 { 
3 bestprice = shoplist[shoplistindex].askprice(player); 
4 bestshop = shoplist [shoplistindex]； 
5 } 
Figure 3.6: A simple shopping agent written in Java (shown partially). 
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Data block: 
int bestBuylndexl = 100; 
int bestBuyIndex2 = 150; //added explicitly 
int best Buy Index3 — 300; //added explicitly 
address bestshopl = "SuperShopA"; 
address bestshop2 = ” SuperShopB，，； //added explicitly 
address bestshop3 = “ SuperShopC" ； //added explicitly 
Figure 3.7: The simple shopping agent is added with noisy code (data block). 
“price-asking" intention. To spread this original intention, we add noisy code as 
in Figure 3.7, 3.8. 
W e spread the original "price-asking" intention to a number of intentions: 
“price-asking", “maintenance-asking", "battery-life-asking". "Maintenance" and 
“battery-life" are partly complementary to "price" because they are also the 
attributes of the product (even correlated). In this case, "maintenance" and 
“battery-life" are supposed to be contrasting to "price". A D V D player cannot 
be low price, long maintenance, and long battery-life at the same time. By 
adding more cost functions to weight over different attributes, intention could 
be further spread, but this shifts the burden to the consumption of computing 
resources. 
Without loss of generality, the above idea could be extended to more agent 
applications. Suppose the agent has N independent attributes, and hence N cost 
functions, to evaluate before making a decision. By intention spreading, we can 
add complementary noisy code to each attribute. This is illustrated in Figure 3.9. 
Each of the attributes is coupled with a set of negation codes. If one randomly 
picks a N-tuple, the probability of this tuple to be the original one is 1/2^. With 
the explicitly added noisy codes, we are equivalently installing a maze into the 
mobile agent. The maze in the agent perplexes onlookers. By assumption, each 
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Code block: 
1 int price = shoplist [shoplistindex]. askprice (player)； 
2 int maintain = shoplist [shoplistindex]. askmaintain (player) ； //added 
3 int batlife = shoplist [shoplistindex]. askbatterylife (player); //added 
4 int ranklndexl = price; 
5 int ranklndex2 二 0.4*price + 0.2*maintain + 0.4*batlife; 
6 int ranklndex3 = batlife; 
7 if (ranklndexl > bestBuylndexl) 
8 { 
9 bestShopl = shoplist [shoplistindex]； 
10 bestBuylndexl = ranklndexl ； 
11 } 
12 if(ranklndex2 > bestBuyIndex2) //added 
13 { 
14 bestShop2 = shoplist [shoplistindex]； 
15 bestBuyIndex2 = ranklndex2; 
16 } 
17 if(ranklndex3 > bestBuylndexS) //added 
18 { 
19 bestShop3 = shoplist [shoplistindex]; 
20 bestBuylndexS = ranklndex3; 
21 } 
Figure 3.8: The simple shopping agent is added with noisy code (code block). 
58 
Chapter 3 Confidentiality in mobile agent systems 
p i i i i i l i i i _ 靈 糧 纖 凝 I i i p 難 聽 憩 纖 I i _ ； ； 思 羅 憩 靈 到 
謎 ^  1 I 1 :::::::::::磁 ^  ] 
1 2 N-1 N 
Figure 3.9: N independent variables are shown, in black, and each of them is 
coupled with the negation codes, in white. The probability of selecting all black 
is trivially 1/2" 
malicious host can execute the agent once and submit the associated results 
to the next host. Same as any other observers, the malicious host can have a 
slight chance to pick up the original N-tuple, meaning the original intention. 
If we introduce M-1 sets of complementary code to each of the attributes, the 
probability for a malicious host to guess the original intention lowers to 1/M斤. 
The example in Figure 3.6, 3.7 demonstrates the case when M = 3 and N=l. The 
probability of a correct guess is 1/3. 
W h e n the noise-added mobile agent returns home, the host can extract the 
correct information brought by the agent. This completes the agent's work. 
Some autonomy is sacrificed because the home machine is participated to select 
the correct path at last. 
By adding noisy code, it is clear that the performance of the agent is de-
graded. Suppose originally there are N sets of independent attributes. If we 
add (M-1) sets of complementary noisy code to each attribute, the probability 
of a correct guess is 1/M^. Besides, the agent is bloated by M times for each 
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of the N attributes. The performance degradation is in the order of (number of 
independent attributes) * (number of sets of noisy code added). With the above 
notation, the order of magnitude is 0(N*M). The degradation is on computation 
and communication. 
3.4.2 Splitting the cost function 
Another example illustrates intention shrinking by splitting the original agent. 
In the last example, the mobile agent is dispatched to ask for the lowest price of 
the D V D player among a number of hosts. The basis of conversion is to convert 
from the specific class to the shared class, and also the common class modules. If 
the mobile agent is originally diversified across a number of intentions, intention 
shrinking by splitting can be applied. 
Suppose a mobile agent is dispatched to ask for several items of informa-
tion and weigh the information with a cost function. For instance, the mobile 
agent is to ask for various attributes about a musical instrument. If the agent is 
autonomous enough, the cost function will be included. The cost function will 
weigh across different attributes, and find the best offer among the hosts. Gen-
erally speaking, we can model the cost function as a function of the attributes 
with different weights. The cost function is as below. 
Costfunction = 2 : 2 , x ^ ) 
=aifiixi) + 02/2(2:2) + …+ an-ifn-i{xn-i) + 
Agent splitting can occur by splitting the cost function. Suppose we split the 
cost function F and replace it by a number of cost functions Fj {xi,x2,Xn-i, Xn), 
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where j=l,2”..,M. Besides, each a^  is the sum of aj,i, where j二 1,2，...,M and 
i—1,2,...,N. W e have the following conditions. 




For each cost function Fi{.), we have the equation. 
Fj{xi,x2, ...,Xn-l,Xn) = � / � 
l<i<N 
Instead of putting the cost function F(.) in the mobile agent, we put the 
cost function Fi{.) in each of the split mobile agent. Suppose the mobile agent 
has the cost function to evaluate: 
cost = 0.2{price) + 0.3{lifetime) + 0.2{discount) + 0.3 {additional features) 
To shrink the intention spectrum, we can divide the original mobile agent 
into four agents, for example. W e can have cost function for each mobile agent 
in this way: 
costi = 0.2{price) + 0{lifetime) + 0{discount) + 0 {additional features) 
cos 力 2 = 0{price) + 0.3 {lifetime) + 0{discount) + 0 {additional features) 
cosh = 0 (price) + 0 (lifetime) + 0.2(discount) + 0 (additional features) 
cosh = 0{price) + 0 {lifetime) + 0{discount) + 0.3{additional features) 
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Summing up costi, cost2, costs, costthe original cost can be calculated. 
Since mobile agents arrive at the host in different time, the remote host can only 
analyze each of them, but cannot relate them and obtain the original summing 
coefficients. To make the agents seemingly not in collaborations, schemes that 
provide anonymity are necessary [48] [49]. Anonymity in mobile agent system 
is studied in the next chapter. 
In addition, agent splitting can be applied with secret sharing schemes. Se-
cret sharing schemes split the original piece of secret into a number of pieces [70'. 
Each piece will not reveal the whole secret unless they work together. Suppose 
we have a secret M， w e can generate a random-bit string R, the same length 
as the message M . Then, we compute S which is (M X O R R). One split agent 
holds S, and one holds R. To reconstruct the message, both agents are required 
to do the X O R operation. Like the above, we can set the original secret M as 
the coefficients in the cost function. Hence, M equals the N-tuple (ai,a2,...,a^ ). 
A random N-tuple is generated (ri,r2,"_，rVi) and we compute: 
(ai，（22, ".,an) XOR (ri, r?, = {si, 52,…，s^) 
First agent has (ri,r2,...,r^ ) while the second one has (51,52,...,5^ ). The secret 
sharing schemes can be extended easily to M split agents, and the secret is 
revealed unless all agents are found to be collaborating. 
It is hard to estimate the strength of intention shrinking since the scheme 
involves many parameters. W e present a rough estimation here. Suppose there 
are originally w mobile agents. After splitting, each agent gives M i split agents, 
where i = 1,2,...,w. In total, there are L agents passing through the remote 
hosts, i.e., 
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A m o n g the L agents, the host can recognize M i agents and group them 
together for the whole secret of the original agent i. Probability of grouping the 
agents to reveal the original agent i is as follows. 
Prob[reveal whole secret of agent i] = ~ 
LCmi 
Suppose the host analyzes a fixed number of agents passing through it, L 
is fixed. The maximum strength is achieved when M i = L/2. However, the 
maximum strength is of theoretical value only because we will never know how 
an analysis is made. 
To account for the performance, splitting an agent introduces additional 
overhead. Suppose an agent contains K statements, and each split agent contains 
Krepeat statements. If the agent is split into M pieces. The overhead is in the 
order of M * Krepeat- To put it simply, the order of magnitude is roughly 0 ( M * 
K ) . 
3.5 Security analysis 
A mobile agent can be analyzed manually or automatically. Through intention 
spreading and shrinking, both of these two kinds of analysis become less useful. 
3.5.1 Human inspection 
By human inspection, it is hard to tell the real intention of the agent. By com-
prehending the program in Figure 3.7, 3.8, the agent has several cost functions 
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to evaluate. The malicious host can target specifically in one cost function, and 
offer the best to the mobile agent in order to win over other hosts. However, 
it does not know for sure which cost function is really considered by the home 
machine eventually. If the malicious host offers an exceptionally low price, but 
it turns out that the mobile agent is not targeting at this factor, the malicious 
host would not gain any benefit. By spreading over more intentions, the mobile 
agent is contained with a lot of varying intentions. The malicious host can at 
most target at one intention and try to win over other hosts using that intention. 
3.5.2 Automatic program comprehension 
Tools are available to comprehend a piece of software, the most prominent one 
is called program slicing [66]. Program slicing is a technique for program sim-
plification based upon the deletion of statements that cannot affect the values 
of a chosen set of variables. Conventionally, a slice is constructed with respect 
to a slicing criterion, (V, n). Commands that have no effect on variables in the 
set V at the point n within the original program are removed from the slice. A n 
example is extracted from [59] to explain program slicing. 
Consider a simple loop program given in Figure 3.10, for which a slice has 
been constructed with respect to the slicing criterion ({s},9)，to capture the 
effect of the program upon the variable s, at the end of the program. 
Program slicing can extract slice automatically if you know which attribute 
you want to isolate. For example, in Figure 3.10, we want to extract statements 
that affect variable s. By intention spreading and shrinking, all variables appear 
to be informative and decisional. An observer does not know which variable 
to isolate. W e can have program slice for each of the variable, but we are not 
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The original program: 
1 i 二 1; 
2 p = l; 
3 s = 0; 
4 while (i < M A X ) 
5 { s = s + i; 
6 p 二 p * i; 
7 i = i + l; 
8 } 
9 output (s,p); 
The slice constructed for the final value of s 
1 i = 1; 
2 
3 s = 0; 
4 while (i < M A X ) 
5 { s = s + i; 
6 
7 i = i + l; 
8 } 
9 
Figure 3.10: A simple loop program and one of its slices. 
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certain which variable will match the original intention, and affect the decision. 
3.6 Related work 
As mentioned, time limited blackbox security and computing with encrypted 
function (CEF) are two streams to achieve confidentiality of non-static portion. 
W e would like to quantitatively claim that the former stream does not spread 
the intention of the mobile agents while the latter stream spreads the intention 
of the mobile agents to a limited degree only. 
3.6.1 Time limited blackbox security 
Time limited blackbox security achieves confidentiality by re-configuring the 
source code. The techniques used to re-configure the agent, like variable re-
composition, control flow conversion, are to structurally convert the agent, not 
to change the global functioning. The mobile agent is still performing the same 
tasks. Linking this with our theoretical background, the conversion is not trans-
forming the class of modules. W e could interpret the individual modules as the 
same class of modules before and after the conversion. The entropy is kept un-
changed. By program slicing techniques, statements that affect the variable are 
extracted. Hence, it just takes time to understand the structure of the program 
modules, and hence to understand the actual intentions. 
3.6.2 Computing with encrypted function 
Computing with encrypted function (CEF) transforms modules from one class to 
another in a limited degree only. Currently, the theoretical ground shows that 
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the coefficients of polynomials can be replaced by encrypted coefficients, and 
the resulted value of the polynomials can be obtained by decryption. However, 
it supports polynomials at this stage. In our terminology, intention spreading 
could occur in C E F if the polynomial before encryption falls in a specific class 
or shared class. After encryption, the specific or shared class of polynomials 
becomes less specific. However, the solutions offered by C E F are confined，and 
require further research. 
3.7 Applicability 
Mobile agent paradigm is promising to work for a wide spectrum of distributed 
applications [11] [23] [76] [77]. Not all applications are security sensitive and 
require agent confidentiality. A m o n g the many applications, agent-mediated 
online shopping and information brokering are usual scenarios that agent confi-
dentiality is essential and vital. 
Electronic commerce is a growing area fueled by the popularity of the Internet 
and; online shopping is a popular item in electronic commerce. In [78] [79], 
the core stages in online shopping are product brokering, merchant brokering 
and negotiation, under agent-mediation or not. Product brokering refers to the 
retrieval of information to determine what to buy. The information is evaluated 
based on the consumer criteria on the product. Merchant brokering refers to 
the retrieval of information to determine who to buy from. The information 
is evaluated based on the consumer criteria on the merchant. The negotiation 
stage means how to settle on the terms of the transaction. Our schemes, which 
include the spreading and shrinking of intention, can be obviously applied to 
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product brokering and merchant brokering. Whenever the consumer asks for a 
subset of attributes, of the product or of the merchants, intention spreading can 
help add noisy attributes, while intention shrinking help split the original subset 
of attributes. Our schemes can incorporate with the negotiation stage. Suppose 
the agent is to negotiate with a set of logic, the noisy code can be interleaved. 
This makes the host know less about the negotiation strategy of the agent. 
Other information brokering agents (like collecting financial information, stock 
information) can be similarly protected with our schemes. 
3.8 Further considerations 
To proceed intention spreading and shrinking in large scale, its weaknesses, its 
relationship with other approaches, and its further development are discussed 
below. 
3.8.1 Weaknesses 
There are at least two counter-attacks to intention spreading alone. Firstly, 
massive colluding attacks can compromise intention spreading if the intention is 
not spread enough. It is simple to illustrate with our example with two newly 
added sets of noisy codes. If there are three or more colluding hosts and each 
of them executes one possibility of the agent. At least one host can win over all 
the hosts since the original intention is revealed. By adding noisy codes far more 
than the number of hosts in the itinerary or nesting spreading with shrinking, 
the probability for a colluding attack can be kept low. 
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Secondly, the host can optimize over different intentions by linear program-
ming. Although the host cannot know the exact cost function that will be used 
for decision finally, the host can optimize over all the contained cost functions. 
This is possible if the optimized inputs fit finally for the original cost function. 
However, the host is not likely to have benefits if it optimizes contrasting factors 
in all the contained cost functions. In this way, the case to optimize all the cost 
functions is not motivated among the hosts. 
To account for the inadequacies, several points are worth considering. Firstly, 
computing resources are consumed without rigorous complexity measurement. 
With intention spreading, we introduce extra code (variables or decision logic) to 
the original mobile agent. With intention shrinking, we introduce extra agents. 
This means to consume more computing and network resources. However, we 
only have a rough estimation on the performance degradation. Secondly, auton-
omy is sacrificed to certain extent. Security-critical operations should be done 
on a neutral host because the agent is still in its plain text form in our scheme. 
For a shopping agent, we cannot delegate the mobile agent to buy directly for 
us. Thirdly, intention spreading and shrinking shifts the burden to the agent 
developers. W e provide some methodologies for them to spread and shrink the 
intention of the agent. However, our scheme takes more development time. Be-
sides, interleaving the original agent with noisy code is considered to introduce 
buggy agent easily [67:. 
3.8.2 Relationship with other approaches 
Our schemes can be interestingly compared with classical cryptography. In clas-
sical cryptography, secret is to be encrypted. By decryption with a correct 
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Figure 3.11: An analogy of intention spreading and shrinking. A n agent is 
analog to a delegation order. Intention spreading arms the original order with a 
number of shadows. Intention shrinking splits each individual order into pieces. 
key, the secret is revealed. This is a one-to-one relation. The correct key un-
leashes the secret. In our schemes, the secret, say the code, is hidden within the 
agent. The host cannot learn anything substantial from the agent. By intention 
shrinking, the secret is further spread across a number of agents. Classical cryp-
tography gives a key-and-lock analogy. Our schemes can be understood with 
another analogy. Suppose the original agent is a delegation order. The order is 
mailed to the hosts for execution. In raw format, the order is vulnerable under 
read attacks. With intention spreading, the order is like to be coupled with a 
pile of "shadow" orders. With intention shrinking, each order, either shadow or 
not, is cut into pieces and are dispatched to the network. To obtain the original 
order，the pieces should be assembled first, and the shadows should be filtered. 
The idea is illustrated in Figure 3.11. 
Our schemes can be incorporated with the existing schemes. Time limited 
blackbox security reconfigures the agent program and makes the program less 
readable. Computing with encrypted functions changes the polynomials into 
70 
Chapter 3 Confidentiality in mobile agent systems 
encrypted version. Our schemes can be applied to other portions of the agent. 
Having melted with existing schemes, the agent becomes less readable, contains 
encrypted polynomials, and carries uncertain intentions. This gives increasing 
confidentiality. 
3.8.3 Further development 
Further development should concentrate on the weaknesses mentioned before. 
Firstly, an automatic scheme should be derived to add and to split a mobile 
agent. This is not easy because noisy code to be added or agent to be split is 
application specific. There are no easy rules to add and to split automatically. 
Secondly, performance analysis should be considered and compared with other 
schemes. Apart from schemes in [32] - [34], we have other emerging schemes 
in [71] - [73]. In [71] [72], a wide range of obfuscating transformations is sug-
gested to make de-obfuscation difficult. The code reconfiguration schemes are 
proposed and are measured with respect to potency, resilience and cost under 
de-obfuscation attacks. In [73], secret sharing technique is mentioned to occur 
within the mobile agent. However, the technique is still developing. Integrating 
the existing schemes, emerging schemes, and our schemes would give a bench-
mark for different levels of confidentiality. 
3.9 Concluding remarks 
The difficulty in protecting the non-static portion of mobile agents is presented. 
This is understood as difficult because few schemes are suggested, and they 
provide limited solutions. W e have suggested intention spreading and intention 
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shrinking, two new designations, to achieve confidentiality in software level. 
Existing schemes focus on the transformation of the original agent to make it 
less readable; our schemes expand on other two axes. One is to add noisy code, 
one is to divide the agent. To better illustrate the effects after code addition and 
agent splitting, we introduce the notion called entropy to measure the spectrum 
of intention of the agent. The original mobile agent has a spectrum describing 
how dedicate it works on a task. By intention spreading, noisy code is added, 
and the spectrum becomes spread. By intention shrinking, agent is split, and 
the spectrum becomes focused. Both schemes perturb the original spectrum and 
increase the difficulty for the host to guess the original intention, and hence the 
decision logic of the agent. Intention spreading and intention shrinking can also 
be nested to hide the intention further. 
Our proposed schemes provide an alternative and an add-on to the existing 
schemes. Obfuscation decreases the readability of the agent's program. Com-
puting with encrypted functions encrypt the polynomials in the agent's program. 
If the malicious hosts have the ability to read the obfuscated program and de-
crypt the encrypted polynomials, they still do not know the original intention 
of the agent. In a probabilistic sense, it is possible to guess wildly and make a 
hit. However, the probability can be adjusted low with spreading and shrinking. 
This provides another level of protection on the existing schemes. 
To assist our schemes, anonymity is an important element. Related issues in 
achieving anonymity are to be covered in the next chapter. 
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Anonymity in mobile agent 
systems 
4.1 Introduction 
Applications like W W W , emails reveal much user-related information. W h e n 
we browse web pages, the web server can, for example, know the IP-address, 
browser type of the user through H T T P [82]. When you send an email，an 
intruder can intercept the mail and know who you are contact with. By even 
more vigorous traffic analysis, the whole profile in your connection time could 
be tracked. This is an intrusion to user's privacy. 
Putting applications into the anonymous versions is to protect user's pri-
vacy. Primarily, anonymity means the receiver does not know the identity that 
initiates the request and an onlooker does not know which two parties are in 
contact. If we refer anonymity in mobile agent systems, it gives an additional 
meaning. It means the protection of the whole route, not to be understood and 
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bind to the originator's identity. Since anonymity obfuscates the relationship 
between the sender and the receiver, it also implies for an increasing difficulty to 
locate seemingly collaborating agents. This is the other purpose of anonymity, 
and which helps the confidentiality schemes we have described in the previous 
chapter. 
Connection anonymity and communication anonymity are branches we will 
discuss for anonymity. Before two end parties communicate, a connection is 
established. Connection anonymity refers to the protection of identities in the 
network layer. Communication anonymity refers to the protection of identities in 
the data that are contained during communication. Communication anonymity 
is sometimes called data anonymity. W e strike to hide identities in both con-
nection and communication. 
In the following sections, solutions to anonymity will be surveyed. Schemes 
to achieve anonymous agents are given, by referencing and integrating existing 
schemes. 
4.2 Solutions to anonymity 
Efforts have been put on achieving anonymity. W e specifically discuss the so-
lutions to build up anonymous systems. Firstly, we discuss the building block, 
called a mix, proposed in [83]. Secondly, we discuss the less interactive group 
signature scheme [84] - [86]. The interactive anonymity solutions like zero 
knowledge proof are out of our scope because mobile agent system requires 
non-interactive schemes. 
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4.2.1 Mixing 
Many current anonymous systems are based on a building block called a mix 
87] - [90]. A mix was proposed by Chaum in [83]. The messages of all parties 
wanting to communicate anonymously are sent through the mix. The mix hides 
the correspondences, the mappings, between messages in its inputs and those in 
its output. The mix is responsible to hide the order of arrival of the messages 
by reordering, delaying and traffic padding. 
H o w does a mix actually help to hide the sender's identity when a message 
is sent from A to B? Suppose A wants to send a message m to B, A sends the 
message 
KMi{RuKB{Ro,m),B) 
to the mix Ml, in which K^ means encrypted with the public key of x，and Ri 
are random values to seal the encryption. The mix decrypts the message, delays 
it, reorders it with other messages, and finally routes the message K b { R o , m) to 
B. B is capable to decrypt and retrieve the message m. In case a single mix is not 
enough for reordering the messages, the mixes can be cascaded. For simplicity, 
A sends a message m to B, by passing through two mixes, M l and M2. 
Km2{R2, Kmi{RuKb{Ro, m),B)),Ml) 
The message m is encrypted with the public key of the mixes. In each mix, 
one layer of encryption is decrypted, and the content is sent to the succeeding 
mix. 
H o w does a mix actually help to hide the sender's identity, and allow the 
receiver to return messages to A? Suppose A wants B to return a message tur 
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for acknowledgement, A tells B the returned address K m i { R i , A^)^ where a mix 
M l is in between A and B and A^ is the real address of A. B sends the message 
A^),KA(Ro, TTIR) 
to the mix Ml, for routing to A. The mix decrypts the first portion, and 
obtains the address A^ and random nonce Ri. It forms a message as 
A^,Iii(KA(Ro,mE)) 
The extracted random nonce Ri is used for further encryption of Ka{Rq, ttir). 
Only sender A can decrypt the resulting output because A created Rq, R i and 
K a - Similarly, the returned address can be cascaded with more mixes. For 
simplicity, we show the case with two mixes. The returned address becomes 
Kmi[RUKM2{R2,A^),M2) 
By encrypting layer by layer, in a sequence of mixes, the sender's identity is 
hidden. In the return track, the identity can be protected by the same technique. 
This serves as the primitive for anonymity in later parts. 
4.2.2 Group signatures 
A digital pseudonym is a public key used to verify signatures made by the 
anonymous holder of the corresponding private key [83]. Group signatures can 
be understood as kind of digital pseudonyms as long as the particular group 
member is not revealed to the public, but the member can prove its identity in 
a group during, for example, signature verification. 
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Many group signatures have been proposed, for different cryptographic as-
sumptions and for different levels of interactivity [84] - [86]. In its simplest term, 
a group signature is similar to a personal digital signature, except the signature 
appears to be signed by a group of people. The verifier can verify the signature 
using the public key of the group, but it does not know the exact group member 
that signs. If the signer misbehaves, the identity can be revoked through reso-
lution. The identity of the signer is protected under normal condition; hence, 
the signer appears to be anonymous. 
Several group signatures are mentioned in [84]，and its first scheme is espe-
cially suitable in mobile agent system for its low interactivity, and easy identity 
escrow. The original scheme is like this. Suppose Z is the trusted authority 
which sets the group signature scheme. Let g be a generator of the multiplica-
tive group Z*, where p is a prime. Group member i creates his own secret key 
Si and gives g'^modp) to Z. In this way, Z has a list of all these public keys 
together with the group member's name. Each week Z gives each group member 
i a randomly chosen number and publishes the list of all the blinded public keys 
During this week group member i will use Siri{modp 一 1) as secret key. 
If the sender's identity is asked to reveal with adequate reasons, the verifier can 
ask Z to revoke the true identity. 
Using this scheme, many pairs of keys are prepared; these are known as the 
digital pseudonyms. Each group member can hold more than one pair of keys, 
and the pairs can be used to create anonymous agents. This will be detailed 
later. 
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4.3 Anonymous agents 
There are two aspects to create anonymous mobile agents. One is on the con-
nection, one is on the communication. W e will apply the above solutions to 
hide the identity-rich information, like agent's itinerary, signature, in these two 
aspects. 
4.3.1 Anonymous connection 
Mobile agents have many connection scenarios since they travel many hops be-
fore they return home. By divide and conquer, the connections can be anony-
mous if each end-to- end connection is made anonymous. W e can simply apply 
the mixes in between end-to- end hosts. Practically, one single mix is not enough 
91]. It takes several mixes in between the end-to-end hosts for anonymous con-
nection. 
Besides using a machine dedicatedly for mixing, onion routers can be used 
for mixing purpose [68] [69]. The network consists of a number of onion routers, 
which have the functionality of ordinary routers, combined with mixing prop-
erties. Agent is sent through a path of onion routers. The path is determined 
by the core data structure called an onion. The working mechanism of an onion 
can be understood as the mentioned layer-by-layer encryption. The onion is 
encrypted with the public key of the onion router to which the onion is sent. It 
contains the next hop information, and an embedded onion that is sent to the 
next onion router. An anonymous connection is established in this way. 
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4.3.2 Anonymous communication 
As mentioned, partial results obtained by the agent are encrypted with the 
originator's public key for confidentiality purpose [38] [39]. By using the public 
key derived from the mentioned group signature scheme, the remote hosts can 
encrypt the results without knowing the exact originator. 
Another item of identity-rich information is the itinerary contained in the 
agent. To travel through the network, the agent brings along with the itinerary. 
The unprotected route is the concatenation of Internet addresses ip{ci). Say, 
r — ip(ci) II …II i'p{cn) is the unprotected route. Approaches in [48] [49. 
slightly address the anonymity issues in itinerary information. A n onion-like 
encryption is done on the itinerary. The unprotected route is transformed to 
the following. 
= Sh�h, ip(ci)，ip(C2)，尽2[. ••]), 
= 丑 E 2 F E K C I ) , 印 ( C 3 ) , 切 ( C 3 ) ,丑E 3 [ . •.])， 
二 丑E(N—L)FE?(CN-2),切(CRO, ， 尔 ( C N - 1 ) , 尔 ( C J ， 丑 E N [ . . •])’ 
= E o R , Sh{ip{cr,-i),ip{cn), EoR)]]. . •]: 
Where the home context h signs data relevant for each host to be visited by 
means of a signature S; the home h encrypts the agent's route using an asym-
metrical encryption method E and the i仇 host's public key ei for i = l,2,...,n. 
Although the next host information is known until the outer layer of the onion 
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is decrypted, an onlooker can observe track the whole path of the agent. Route 
ri is not privacy-protected. By inserting a single mix, for example, between a 
pair of hosts, we have the modified route T2. 
7*2 = i'p{ci),Sh{h, zp(mi), zp(ci), E^ i[‘..])， 
=Eei[ipijrh), ip(m2), Sh(ip(mi), , ip(m2), . •]), 
=五m2[切(Ci), ip(C2), Sh{ip{ci),ip{m2), ip(C2), [‘ •.]), 
=五e2[访O2), Sh(ip{m2), ip[c2),ip{m^), Em2>\' •.)， 
=五m(n—1)[尔(Cn-2),如(Cn-1), (尔(C”—2),尔O^ n-l),尔(C^ -l),丑e(n-l)[. ])， 
=Ee(n- l ) [ ip ( jnn- i ) , ipfjUn), Sh(ip(jnn-iX ip(Cn-i), ipirUr^), Emn['..])， 
=Emn[ip(Cn-i) , ip[Cn), Sh(J^P[Cn—i), ipifUr^), ip(Cn), •.]), 
=Een[ip{rnn), ipijUn+iX ShiipirUn}, ipl^Cn), ipijUn+l), E—ri+1) [. . •]), 
=Em{n+l)[ip{Cn), h, Sh{ip{Cn), ip{mn+l), /l)]]]] . •.]]: 
However, each host Q, where i=l,2,...,n, in route t] does not know the address 
of the originator h. In case the agent is required to return in the intermediate, 
the route r^  shows the originator's address. This is not privacy-protected too. 
In this way, another modified route r^  contains the anonymous returned address. 
=Eel[Kqi{Ri，h), ip(mi), ip(m2)，Sh{Kqi{Ri, h), ip(mi)，尔(ci), 
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= 丑 m2 [尔(Cl), ip(C2)，Sh[ip�C 如 p(jn2), ip�C2),丑 e2 卜• ‘])， 
二 丑e2[i^Q2(丑2, h),ip{m2),ip{ms), Sh{KQ2{R2, h),ip{m2),ip{c2), 
ip{m3),Em3[" •])： 
=Em�n-l)[iHCn-2), ipQCn-i), Sh{ip�Cn_2) , ipirUn—i), i:p[Cn-i�, 
二 Eein-l�[KQ�n-l�[Rn-l, h)  ipirrin-l), ip{mn), Sh�KQ(n—l)[Rn-l, 
=Emn[ip[Cn-i) , ip�Cn), Sh�i:P�Cn-i)，ip—n), ipi^Cn), ..])， 
=Een[KQn{Rn, h), ip{mn), ip{mn+l), Sh{KQn{Rn, h), ip{mn), ip{Cn), 
ip{mn+l),Em{n+l)["']), 
=五m(n+i)[访(Cn)，Sh{ip{cn), ip{mn+i),h)]]]].. •]]: 
With the modified rs, each host has the returned address, with another set of 
mixes Q, to route message to the originator. Figure 4.1 illustrates the scenario 
by showing the first remote host. At this stage, each host does not know where 
the agent is sent from, yet it can return message to the originator through mixes. 
However, each host can verify signature using public key of the originator, the 
key itself is an information to determine the identity of the originator. To fight 
back, we use group signature scheme mentioned. 
Before dispatching the mobile agent, the agent owner asks for enough pairs 
of keys from the trusted authority Z. The secret keys are used for signature 
generation. Suppose the secret keys are 或，where i = 1,2,...,N, we have the 
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Figure 4.1: This figure shows one remote host only, and it can be extended to n 
hosts. In the forward direction, agent is sent through mix M . In the backward 
direction, return messages are sent through mix Q. 
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modified route r4 as follows. 
r4 = Emi[h, ip{ci),Sh{h, ip{mi),ip{ci),Eei[..])， 
=Eel[Kqi [Ri, h)，ip(mi)，ip—�, Sai [Kqi[Ri , h)，z>(mi), ip{ci), 
尔(爪2)，丑m2 [...]), 
=五m2[尔(Ci)，ip(c2), Sh(2p(ci), ip—�, ip(C2),五e2[. . •]), 
=Ee2[KQ2{R2, h),ip{m2),ip{m3), SA2{KQ2{R2, h),ip{m2),ip{c2), 
ip{m3),Em3["-]), 
= ^ m ( n - l ) [ip{Cn-2),ip{Cn-l), Sh{ip{Cn-2), ip{mn-l), ip(Cn-l), 
Ee{n-l)[‘ • •]), 
=丑e(n-l)[i^Q(n-l)(i?n-l,")，尔(m几-l),ip(mJ，SU(n-;L)(i^Q(n-l)(^n-l， 
h),ip{mn-i),ip{cr,-i),ip{mn),Emn[‘..])， 
=Emn[ip(Cn-l) , ip[Cn) , Sh(ip(Cn-l), ipirUn), ip{Cn),Een[' . •]), 
=Een[KQn{Rn, h), ipfjUn), ip—n+l), SAn{KQn{Rn, h), ipfjUn), ip[Cn), 
ip{mn+i),Em{n+l)["']), 
二 Emin+I) [ip{cn), h, (zp(c^), ), h)]]]] •..]]: 
With the modified route r^ , sender's identity cannot be traced through the 
personal public key, say, in a digital certificate [70]. The host knows the signature 
is a valid group signature. For identity revocation, the host needs to ask the 
trusted authority Z. 
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4.4 Concluding remarks 
The purposes of achieving anonymity are presented. Firstly, it is the protection 
of privacy. Being anonymous makes the identity-rich information untraceable. 
Secondly, it is the de- correlation of collaborating agents. Being anonymous 
obfuscates the correspondences between agents. An onlooker cannot trace and 
correlate a group of agents easily if anonymity is achieved. 
Solutions to most anonymous systems are discussed. The basic building block 
is called a mix, which is an intermediate specially designed to hide the flow of 
traffic between its input and output. Another solution is the notion of digital 
pseudonym, proposed by Chaum. It is used to hide the identity during public 
key retrieval. A group signature can be used as a digital pseudonym to replace 
the true identity with the group identity. Group members share the same group 
identity, for third party verification. 
In mobile agent systems, we apply both mixes and digital pseudonyms for 
connection anonymity and communication anonymity. Mixes are added in be-
tween two end hosts. Onion data structure is passing through the mixes to 
route the message from the source to the destination. In our case, the message 
is actually the agent. To prove that certain data is originated from a trusted 
identity, and to allow only the originator for decryption, group signature is used. 
In this case, public key of a group, the pseudonym, can be used for signature 
verification and data encryption. The agent owner only need to know how to 
sign and decrypt using its lists of secret keys. 
W e have concealed agent's identity during connnection, and multi-hopping. 
For complete anonymity, any identity-related informatoin found in the execution 
84 
Chapter 3 Confidentiality in mobile agent systems 











This thesis revolves about the mobile agent security. Not all security issues 
are solved satisfactorily. W e bring out the open issues that are not addressed 
in this thesis, and are weakly addressed in literature. Open security issues are 
discussed, and then the performance issues, which are closely related to security. 
5.2 Security issues 
Challenging security problems are remained open in mobile agent security. Some 
are reachable, and they require much more solid work. Some are not easily 
reachable, and are considered to be difficult [31]. They are described as follows. 
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5.2.1 Reachable problems 
Our scheme provides an alternative in achieving confidentiality; yet, its bot-
tlenecks are the non-automation, and performance degradation. H o w should 
we transform the mobile agent to make its executable part confidential au-
tomatically? H o w can we reduce the performance degradation during such a 
transformation? It takes an extensive study on the structure of mobile agent 
to exploit any convertible functions. Cryptographic approaches like computing 
with encrypted functions are promising for the transformation, and to extend 
the encryption of passive data to active executable data. To account for the 
performance, different levels of security schemes, either cryptographic or non-
cryptographic, should be derived. 
Availability refers to the scheduling of resources for fair allocation. The 
mobile agent should be given an agreed-upon quality of service (QOS). However, 
current schemes on Q O S rely on the proper functioning of mobile agent host. 
The host is designed to give enough resources to the agent, but not necessarily for 
faithful agent execution. For example, resources are consumed to execute host 
initializations not relevant to agent execution, but they are counted. Although 
the agent owner can check for the execution trace to determine which statements 
the host has executed, the trace is not glued with resource allocation information. 
For a better approach, we have to exploit the methods to bind resources-aware 
information to the execution trace. The trace not only shows the execution 
of the statements, but also the resources allocated during the execution. The 
modified execution trace can be analyzed for the Q O S as well. 
In deriving new schemes for any security requirements, some points are worth 
considering. Firstly, it is the evaluation of the application to determine whether 
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it requires the mobile agent paradigm. Mobile agent paradigm is suitable for 
high-latency networks, autonomous interactions with remote hosts. If the ap-
plications can employ other distributed computing paradigms, not necessarily a 
new scheme is needed. Secondly, it is the effects of concurrent schemes in agent 
security and host security. When host security schemes are proposed, focus is 
put in protecting host, and some schemes are worked against the agent [95'. 
This is not beneficial to agent security. Schemes should be derived to balance 
between agent security and host security. Moreover, it is the common practice 
to evaluate the new schemes with those that are under standardization [92". 
5.2.2 Difficult problems 
W e have mentioned some difficult problems that are not necessarily solvable 
technically. For example, the verification of an interpreter, to guarantee that it 
is untampered, and the execution spanned by it is semantically correct. Besides, 
it appears hard to prevent execution anomaly of the interpreter. W e have no 
ways to control the execution of the interpreter, for example, to ensure that the 
agent runs to its completion. W e can detect execution anomaly by tracing, but 
not to prevent. Moreover, it is also hard to distinguish an agent from its clone. 
This is similar to pirated software sold on the market. Digital watermarking will 
give some insights into this area. 
5.3 Performance issues 
Security issues invoke another equally important issues, performance. W e discuss 
some unsolved performance issues of the mobile agent systems. W e propose an 
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optimizing protocol for security and performance benefits [26 . 
5.3.1 Complexity and strength 
Security schemes require additional computing resources; yet, the strength and 
the complexity are not comparable. For example, we have surveyed a number 
of schemes in achieving confidentiality; yet, they do not have c o m m o n metrics 
to compare. Some of them are ad hoc approaches like our scheme, some are 
standard cryptographic approaches. In order to compare the schemes, we need 
to derive metrics to measure 
• Strength of the security schemes 
• Complexity needed to attain the schemes; this gives information on the 
performance degradation 
Meanwhile, toolkits for simulation of different security schemes should be 
made. This is useful to simulate a network of mobile agents, and measure the 
overhead, either commmunication or computation, for quantified strength of 
security. 
Since security and performance are two contrasting factors, some methods are 
needed to optimize both factors. A n optimizing protocol, which is prototypical, 
called "Trust-level exchanging protocol" is proposed to weigh these two factors 
2 6； . 
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Home 弥p 2 Remote 
Machine ^ ^ Host 
Step 1 
Figure 5.1: The trust-level exchanging protocol with two-hop agents. 
5.3.2 An optimizing protocol 
It is obvious to observe, the better the security, the worse the performance. 
Hence, an optimizing strategy is needed to weigh these two factors. Our pro-
posed protocol concerns on both agent security and host security. It depends on 
the trust level between the end-to-end hosts to assign security schemes of neces-
sary strength for optimization. The protocol is described in two cases: namely, 
two-hop agents and multi-hop agents. 
In the scenario with two-hop agents, only home machine and one remote 
host is involved. The protocol is of two main steps. Firstly, it is the exchange 
of authentication information. Secondly, it is to express the trust level (Figure 
5.1). 
Based on the authentication information obtained by the home machine, and 
the remote host, both of them can assign a trust level to their neighbor. The 
trust level can be finely grained in M-ary levels. For example, level 0 means 
that the neighboring host trusts the mobile agent completely and requests for 
no protection at all. The trust level of the remote host can be different from 
the trust level of the home machine. The idea of M-ary trust levels is stemmed 
from the Trust Model of Microsoft: which divides Internet Request Object in 
different Security Zones [93.. 
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Figure 5.2: The trust-level exchanging protocol with multi-hop agents. 
Once the trust level is known by the home machine, the home machine can 
equip and verify the mobile agent in ways that satisfy the trust level of itself 
and the neighboring host respectively. For example, home machine can equip 
the agent by adding noisy code, messing up the code, encrypting part of the 
code. This protects the agent. O n the other hand, the home machine can verify 
the agent by appending a program's proof, known as the proof carrying code. 
Or, the home machine can ask a trusted third party to verify the agent for a 
valid certificate [18] [19]. This protects the remote hosts. 
The two parties can agree beforehand on the mapping between trust level 
and the protection schemes. In case a mapping is not known in advance, the 
protocol can be extended to directly request the home machine to use certain 
protection schemes. 
In the scenario with multi-hop agents, the agent can migrate to any number 
of hosts. The trust level exchanging protocol is extended, with the help of 
a trusted third party (Figure 5.2). The protocol is presented in two phases: 
initialization and progressing. 
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• Initialization: 
1. The Trusted Third Party (TTP) is given a mapping between trust-level 
and host's identity. W h e n the T T P knows the remote host's identity 
through authentication, the T T P knows the trust-level the home machine 
assigned to this host. 
2. The T T P is delegated to enforce both host security and agent security. 
3. For host security, the T T P is delegated to, for example, a) generate a 
proof of the mobile agent; b) certify the mobile agent using some "token 
of trust". 
4. For agent security, the T T P is delegated to, for example, a) add noisy code 
to the agent; b) mess up the program; c) encrypt part of the agent. 
5. The T T P is given a mapping between the trust-levels and the protection 
schemes to use, both in host security and agent security. 
• Progressing: 
1. The first host to visit is specified in the itinerary and it is known as Host 
#1. 
2. Host # 1 and the T T P exchange authentication information. The T T P 
can exchange the originator's authentication information. 
3. Based on the authentication information of the neighboring host, the T T P 
knows the trust level the originator has assigned to Host #1. With the 
help of another mapping, the T T P knows how to equip the mobile agent 
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in order to protect itself from malicious attacks. This is agent security 
on demand. 
4. Based on the authentication information supplied by the TTP, Host # 1 
knows the trust-level to assign to the T T P (in essence, the originator) to 
guarantee any further communication between T T P and itself. Host # 1 
announces the level of trust, which is similar step 2 in the case of two-hop 
agents. 
5. Based on the trust-level received from Host #1，the T T P knows how to 
configure the agent to verify itself. This is host security on demand. 
6. In case Host # 1 does not satisfy with the proof, it rejects to execute the 
agent. 
7. In case Host # 1 does satisfy with the proof, it acknowledges the agent. 
8. W h e n Host # 1 has finished executing the agent, it marshals the execution 
state, and ships to the TTP. 
9. The progressing phase repeats from step 1，with Host # 1 replaced by the 
next host. If the next host is the originator, the progressing phase ends. 
With the proposed protocol, the trust levels between host-to-host can be 
taken into account and are used to decide the security levels. The idea is security 
on demand. This approach is similar to SSL that ciphers to be used can be 
negotiated between two end parties. Besides, the protocol is not bounded to 
any protection schemes. This allows the accommodation of newly added security 
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components. For example, an algorithm for stronger verification (host security) 
or for stronger program encryption (agent security) can be updated in the TTP. 
The proposed protocol is prototypical and is not under implementation level 
testing. At least two weaknesses can be found. Firstly, execution state is traveled 
in two-pass, from the first host via the T T P to the second host. The execution 
state can be large in some applications. Secondly, network traffic loading is heavy 
on the TTP. The T T P is required to transmit the mobile agent in different sizes 
per hop time. The transmission link of the T T P should be reliable, and of 
low-latency. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
Open issues in security and in performance have been unfolded. For sure, the 
issues are not only confined to those mentioned in this chapter. In the per-
spective of security, the way to make automatic program transformation, and to 
link resource-related information with execution tracing are challenging prob-
lems. The verification of an untampered interpreter, that executes the agent 
faithfully, is considered to be not easily reachable. 
Security and performance are contrasting. W h e n the security strength is 
high, the performance degradation is severe. To give a benchmark for differ-
ent security schemes, metrics in measuring security strength and performance 
degradation should be derived. To optimize these two factors, an optimizing 
strategy is needed. W e have mentioned an optimizing protocol to balance secu-
rity and performance factors by relating the security schemes to the trust levels. 
The trust levels reflect the strength of security schemes needed. The protocol 
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is in its infancy, yet, the rationale behind it is important. That is, security on 
demand. Security schemes are glued with the agent for agent security and for 






The framework for protection of mobile agents is established. 
To start with, the evolution of the mobile agent paradigm is presented. Many 
paradigms are possible for distributed computing. The most commonly used one 
is message passing. Then, we have the remote procedure call and distributed 
objects. Mobile agent paradigm is the next stage of evolution, by introducing 
two elements: client customization, and self-contained-ness. Clients can dispatch 
their own agents to the agent platform to collect useful information, and return 
home. Agents are self-contained, self-executable programs to be itinerant on the 
network. 
However, systems employing mobile agents are open to many security prob-
lems. To facilitate our discussion，we interpret the meaning of attacks and 
defense. A n existing abstract model of attack is ready to explain why and how 
the attacks are initiated. Both the mobile agents and the mobile agent platforms 
are modeled as theoretical machine. Agent machine is hosted in remote machine, 
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and hence the critical operations like “memory read", "memory write" are mon-
itored and controlled by the remote machine. Based on this model, agents on 
the network are at stake. Possible instances of attacks are surveyed. Masquerad-
ing, spying out agent and agent communication, inappropriate execution of the 
agent, and repudiation are cases in point. 
To defend, the mobile agent system must incorporate a number of security 
requirements that are similar to those in other systems. They are, namely, 
integrity, accountability, confidentiality, anonymity and availability. W e have 
surveyed the schemes that meet the requirements. A m o n g the schemes, in-
tegrity and accountability have been solved quite satisfactorily at this stage. 
Confidentiality, anonymity and availability still remain difficult problems. This 
thesis addresses confidentiality and anonymity in particular, which also leads to 
a natural resolution of the availability issue. 
W e have proposed two methodologies, intention spreading and intention 
shrinking to achieve confidentiality. These are ad-hoc approaches. To measure 
how dedicated an agent is working on a task, we introduce the notion called en-
tropy, that is used in information theory, to quantify intention. The higher the 
entropy, the more information about an agent's intention is exposed; the reverse 
the less. Each mobile agent carries with an intention spectrum and the malicious 
host can learn incorrect intentions from the agent if the intention spectrum is 
spread out. The intention spectrum can be spread by adding noisy, contrasting 
code to the agent. As a complementary scheme, intention shrinking can be used 
to shrink the spectrum by splitting the agent into multiple collaborating agents 
reside in different hosts to reduce the amount of information disclosed to any par-
ticular host. To better incorporate with the intention shrinking scheme, agents 
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in collaboration should be de-correlated，and masked to hide the relationships. 
This requires anonymity. 
Anonymity serves two purposes: one is to hide the identity-rich information, 
the other is to de-correlate the relationship among agents if an onlooker uses the 
identity to correlate. Solutions to anonymity have been mentioned. They are, 
namely, the mixes, and the group signatures. Other interactive protocols for 
anonymity are not considered in mobile agent systems since agent applications 
should be non-interactive. Anonymous agents apply both these two techniques. 
Firstly, it is the anonymous connection. The mixes in between end-to-end hosts 
perplex the end-to-end identities in the onlooker's perspective. Yet, any back-
route message can be returned through the mixes. Secondly, it is the anonymous 
communication. Itinerary is an item of information that is carried by each agent. 
It is identity-rich, since portion of it is digitally signed. Digital signature is 
replaced by group signature. The verifier only knows that it is a valid signature 
of a group, so it does not know which entity that signs it. 
Apart from the solutions mentioned in this thesis, there are many open issues 
remained unsolved, and are not even addressed in literature. For example, fully 
automatic program transformation for confidentiality purpose is considered to 
be challenging. Resource information, or QOS-information, to be embedded in 
the execution trace for after-the-fact detection is necessary not only to determine 
the statements executed by the host, but also the resources consumed for the 
execution. This is part of the availability issue. Coupled with security issues are 
the performance issues. To better quantify the strength of the security schemes, 
and performance degradation, metrics are needed in the future. Besides, it is 
the trade off between the contrasting factors of security and performance. W e 
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have proposed a preliminary protocol to weigh these two factors. The protocol 
assigns different security schemes on the mobile agent according to the trust 
levels between the home machine and remote hosts. It is built on the concept 
of "security on demand". Security schemes are glued with the agent for host 
security and for agent security upon request. 
Mobile agent paradigm grows with significant potentials in the years to come. 
This thesis serves as a self-contained document in exploring the security foun-
dation of this paradigm. 
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